游戏邦在:
杂志专栏:
gamerboom.com订阅到鲜果订阅到抓虾google reader订阅到有道订阅到QQ邮箱订阅到帮看

独立游戏开发者该如何前向发展(五)

发布时间:2015-02-27 10:16:16 Tags:,,,,

作者:David Galindo

在游戏发行后一年,我觉得自己好像刚刚开始发行游戏。

CSD(from gamasutra)

CSD(from gamasutra)

《Cook,Serve,Delicious!》于2012年10月面向PC发行,并且已经转向多个不同的平台和分销服务。几个月前我曾公开游戏前几个月的销售情况,而今天我将讨论一年中游戏的销售数据,销售策略,平台表现以及将其带到更高高度的巨大机遇。我希望这系列文章能够帮到那些带有各自策略和游戏发行计划的独立开发者们。

预测销售情况和手机市场

当我在编写之前关于《Cook,Serve,Delicious!》的销售文章时,我做出了许多预测。首先,我计划在4月份面向Android和iPhone发行游戏,并且单单在手机平台每个月能够赚取3500美元,同时我会在1月份发行一款新游戏。

但是事实证明所有的这一切都是错误的。

首先,面向Android移植游戏需要比预期花费更长时间,游戏的最终发行时间变成7月。其次,尽管花费了几周的时间我仍未能让游戏有效地运行于iPhone3或iPhone4上,因为在削减游戏玩法组件前我不能删除足够的游戏资产去匹配256兆的内存,所以我只能选择抛弃这一版本。最终,游戏每个月的平均销售额为1500美元,即使在7月份多出了Android版本的收益,但是其销售额还是逐渐下滑。9月份更是达到最低值,即只赚到1000美元左右的收益(游戏邦注:有三分之一收益是来自Android平台)。

让我们回顾一下。尽管不是最赚钱的市场,但是Android平台仍带给我们很棒的体验。从7月到10月1日,Android版本的游戏共赚到2223美元的收益,而从1月到10月iPad版本的总收益是15013美元。需要记住的是单单在1月份iPad版本的销售额就达到了5013美元。

虽然Android版本的数值低于iPad版本,但如果让我重新选择的话我还是会将游戏移植到Android。该平台上的开发工具优于苹果—-在Android我只需要花费几个小时便能够发行更新内容,而苹果却需要经历好几天的审查时间,并且Android上添加成就和浏览数据的UI更加方便,这让我能够轻松对不满意的消费者做出回应,而不是像在iPad上那样对用户问题无能为力。虽然相对于Android,iOS始终是我们的优先选择,因为它是主要的收益来源,但是随着时间的发展,它们的收益差距会不断缩小。

然而基于零售平台的Android却是另一种情况。因为渴望新的体验,我尝试着将游戏带到三星,亚马逊的应用商店以及像Moriboo等免费体验网站。因为与这些零售商店签订了合同,所以我不能在此分享一些硬数据,但是根据到目前为止的销售情况,我只能说我们根本不必要将游戏移植到这些平台上。

在10月份,iPad是我的主要收入来源,尽管我并未真正在这一市场上推广游戏。我发行了游戏更新内容,但却未进行任何广告(对于任何版本的游戏)。在4月(从4.99美元降至2.99美元一周)和7月(3.99美元)的降价创造了小幅度的销售额提升,但其实并未出现明显的变化。除了1月份所创造的5067销售额外,从整体来看今年的销售情况并不是很突出(9月份甚至低至674美元)。这与我所期待的每个月创造3千美元以上的销售额相差甚远。但再一次地,与我在1月份面对DLC更新时所采取的做法一样,我并未大力去推广游戏。这便是所谓的你投入多少便能够得到多少。

在台式机上的表现

在PC/Mac/Linux方面,情况似乎也不是很乐观。从1月到10月份单单我的网站的总销售额大概是3600美元(同样时间内其它网站所创造的额外收益只有600美元)。6月份,我能够将游戏带到Humble Store上,这对于独立开发者来说是一个值得信赖的平台。

pay(from gamasutra)

pay(from gamasutra)

因为Humble Store并未真正存在,所以游戏并未真正从中收益,但是通过使用他们所提供的服务,游戏收益的确出现了增长。使用HS服务所获得的销售额比使用BMT Micro多出了2倍,尽管数量不多,但对于游戏知名度未出现明显变化的时候这仍然是不错的成绩。通过处理了CSD交易我放弃了BMT Micro,Humble服务也帮助游戏从1月到10月增加了2100美元的收益。我希望在自己今后的游戏中继续使用Humble Store服务。

10月份的销售情况

从手机平台到台式机,游戏从1月到10月的总销售额为22624美元,这意味着从2012年10月发行以来我从游戏中共赚取了34000美元。扣除9千至1万美元的成本后,游戏的利润大概是24000美元,虽然从表面上看来这是不错的结果,但是因为我在12月份便辞掉之前的工作转向全职游戏创造,这便意味着这些钱是我的唯一收入来源(在同样时间内我的另外一款游戏所创造的收益还不到2000美元)。这意味着我能够用于下一款游戏创造的预算将较少,并且它将再次成为一款孤注一掷的游戏—-如果我的下一款项目不能吸引广大玩家的注意力,我便只能重新找工作了。

随后发生了一件可能彻底改变我的生活的事。

steam(from gamasutra)

steam(from gamasutra)

Greenlight

有天早上我收到一封邮件:我的游戏《Cook,Serve,Delicious!》通过了Greenlight。这是一封合法的邮件,但却被当成了垃圾邮件,因为我并未出现在Greenlight前100款游戏中(那时候Steam每个月只接受8至10款游戏)。于是我便前往了Greenlight页面一探究竟。从接受标识看来我的游戏的确通过了Greenlight,其中还包括其它将近100款游戏。

我非常惊喜,简直不敢相信这是事实。这就像中了乐透一样。我的游戏竟然出现在Steam上了!在《Oil Blue》被Steam拒绝了3次后,我的另一款游戏花了将近1年的时间终于被Steam所接受了。

当我平复了情绪后,我开始认真思考问题。我意识到自己将与其它上百款同样通过审查的游戏展开竞争。我快速浏览了所有的这些游戏并搞清楚哪些游戏已经完成而哪些游戏和我的一样正准备分销,以及哪些游戏仍然处于早期概念/测试阶段。虽然有些游戏已经完成了,但是其开发者却未意识到自己通过了Greenlight,所以我知道这些游戏短时间内还不会出现在Steam上。谢天谢地,我所使用的引擎(Game Maker Studio)具有Steam API,能够支持Achievements,云端和排行榜等功能,所以我便开始努力面向Steam设置我的游戏。

有些游戏早于我的游戏出现在了Steam上,我也记录下了他们的发行策略。有个开发者拒绝提供给那些通过捆绑销售获得游戏的人Steam key,并因此遭到了来自Steam论坛的抵制,所以我便立即在Desura,我的网站以及Humble Store面向当前的游戏玩家提供key。还有些开发者未提供额外的Steam支持而发行游戏,从而导致一些Steam社区成员延迟获得游戏。这些开发者的实践告诉我一定要重视在Steam平台的发行。我只有一次机会能够面向Steam发行游戏,如果我不能尽所能地利用这次机会,我一定会后悔死。

游戏最初的定价是8.95美元,而Steam建议将价格提升到9.99美元以匹配该平台上的大部分游戏。随着价格的提升,我决定不仅要支持Steam功能,同时还要添加一些我本来所构想的内容,如Key Binding支持。我很担心提高1美元的价格会遭到玩家的指责,但幸好我还未听到任何抱怨。实际上我非常看好带有全新内容的游戏,而Steam API也带给了我很多帮助。

面向Steam的发行

2013年10月8日,即《CSD》官方发行一周年后几天,这款游戏出现在了Steam上。在短短的一天时间里我便获得了将近15000美元的销售总额,这几乎等同于我在去年面向PC/Mac/Linux销售游戏所赚取的收益。在两天时间里我便超越了这一数值。一周间,游戏共获得了超过5万美元的总收益—-远远超过我在过去三年里作为游戏开发者所创造的成绩。我的家人都不相信这一结果。我自己也不敢相信。这是一条需要花费好几年努力才能触及的道路,但我最终还是走到了这里。

但这却只是一个开始。我参加了11月Steam的促销活动,并在游戏打五折的情况下获得了三倍的每日收益。在12月的Steam促销中也是如此。

在12月的某一天我收到了大量Twitter回复。我的游戏在那天凌晨4点被选为Steam冬季2.5促销的限时抢购游戏。我有点懵了:我不知道怎么会这样,我是否真的准备好基于这样低的价格去出售游戏?如果玩家在面对如此低的价格后不愿意再购买原价游戏的话我的游戏销售额是否会受到影响?

我疯狂地检查着我的销售数据。只多出了几百美元的收益,如此看来可能人们对游戏并不感兴趣吧。但后来我发现是Steam冻结了凌晨4点促销中的所有数据。我不清楚它是如何做到的。

一开始我真的很兴奋,但突然间我意识到自己成曾经在Steam和Twitter上让玩家们去购买5折的游戏,因为《CSD》将不会出现在限时折扣中。我突然感到很堂皇,并快速在论坛上纠正了我的错误。

促销结束于中午12点。我检查了数据,发现共赚取了6千美元的收益,与昨天的销售额相比上升了将近6倍。这真的太棒了。等等,这只是从凌晨4点到5点之间的数据。当我继续更新时发现销售额仍继续增加。幸好我有事要去亲戚家,不然我一定会疯狂地点击刷新按键的。

我们在Schlotzsky吃了午饭,因为我没有智能手机,只有iPod,所以我只能使用那里的Wi-Fi上网。在和妹妹排队的时候我快速连上了网并打开了促销页面。

在不到8个小时的时间里我的游戏便赚取了超过5万美元的收益。并在这个时间段里卖出了2万份游戏。天哪!是2万份啊!我的上一款游戏《Oil Blue》在发行后的三年时间里也才卖出1千多份!

事后影响

我不敢保证在限时抢购后游戏的销售会怎样。我的想法是,因为在几个小时内出现如此低的价格,所以事后其销量肯定会大幅度下降,但结果却完全相反,即自从限时抢购后到12月促销结束时,游戏的每日收益翻了2倍。

我不敢保证在假期过后游戏的销售会怎样,但根据结果,在经过一周左右的时间,销售额恢复到了促销之前的正常水平。

不竟如此,游戏在其它平台上的销售情况也随着Steam版本的发行而发展,即自从2013年10月以来Android版本便创造了超过3千美元的收益,iOS版本也创造了超过5千美元的收益。

sales for ios and android(from gamasutra)

sales for ios and android(from gamasutra)

人们仍然会不断发现这款游戏,并且总是会出现关于游戏的全新YouTube视频,从而再次掀起新高峰。

Steam上的总数值

所以到目前为止Steam上的总销售额如何?在分析了正常收益后,我在Steam上的短短3个月时间便创造了超过13万的收益。每次打出这一数值仍然会让我感叹。这简直是不可能出现的事呢!

这款游戏在所有平台上的总销量是52539。这远多于我的想象,并且到目前为止在所有平台上每天还会卖出大概40至60份游戏。(不包括促销/推广时期)。

对于我来说PC和iOS平台是最大的赢家,而Linux则是带来最少收益的平台。如果Steam Machines和Steam OS能够完善Linux的渗透率的话情况可能会有所好转。

接下来?

今后《Cook,Serve,Delicious!》的发展将趋于平衡,但并不会结束。今天我已经发行了《CSD》的iPhone5/iPod Touch 5版本,这主要是出于乐趣,并且我也未进行真正的宣传。我想要看看这么做的结果,并且我希望在这个月单单这个版本至少能够创造500美元的收益。

我也计划将《CSD》移植到主机上,但这似乎是个徒劳的努力。我曾与各种“移植”工作室进行交谈,有一家工作室愿意移植游戏,但他们认为需要对游戏进行大量重组以确保游戏变得更加简单,从而更加适合休闲玩家。

还有另一家要公司—-尽管其中一位开发者真的很喜欢游戏并愿意支持我,但事实上他们却并未真正这么做。一支开发团队愿意执行这一任务,但却缺少逆向工程去完成简单的移植,这意味着他们需要重头开始进行编程,即我需要为此投入大量的时间,而那时候的我已经开始着眼于自己的下一款游戏了。

如此看来这款游戏将不可能移植到主机平台上,这对于这时候的我来说并没有太大影响,因为我已经在Steam上赚取了巨大的收益,并且也准备致力于下一款游戏。

未来

基于在Steam上赚到的收益,我的下一款游戏预算将会是最初的4倍,这让我可以不再使用Kickstarter和Early Access进行融资,并专注于创造一款完整的游戏。我希望在3月份发行新游戏,并且我也有预感这将会是一次巨大的发行,当然了,前提是它会是一款优秀的游戏。

如果你看过我之前写的文章,你便会清楚我走到今天的位置是多么不容易。很多时候我都出现了放弃的想法。我也多次因为游戏难以维持生计而重新工作。我并未制正是如此。我来说除了创造游戏我并不想再做其它事了。幸好现在我实现了这一目标。

原文发表于2014年1月9日,所涉事件和数据均以当时为准。

本文为游戏邦/gamerboom.com编译,拒绝任何不保留版权的转发,如需转载请联系:游戏邦

How much do indie PC devs make, anyways? (Part V)

by David Galindo on 01/09/14

One year after its release, it feels like I’m barely starting to launch my game.

“Cook, Serve, Delicious!” was released on October 2012 to PC, and has since moved on to several different platforms and distribution services. I wrote an article months ago outlining the first few months of sales, and today I’d like to wrap it all up in this one year look of sales data, strategies for selling my game, platform performance, and huge opportunities that shot the game higher than I ever imagined it going. It’s been an insane ride, and I hope these series of articles can help indie devs out there with their own strategies and game launches. So let’s get to it!

Predicting Sales and the Mobile Market

When I wrote up my last sales article on Cook, Serve, Delicious, I had many predictions. First, I was planning on releasing the game to Android and iPhone in April, and have $3,500 in sales monthly on mobile alone, with my next game releasing in January.

Turns out all of that was completely wrong.

Firstly, the Android port took longer than expected, resulting in a July release. Secondly I couldn’t get the game to run properly on iPhone 3 or 4 despite weeks of work, so I had to cancel that version outright as I couldn’t cut enough of the game’s assets down to fit the 256mb of memory before having to cut gameplay components. And finally, my monthly mobile sales ended up averaging ~$1,500 a month, going lower and lower through the year, even with the added Android revenue in July. September hit rock bottom, with barely $1,000 in sales (a third coming from Android).

But let’s back up a bit. Android, while not the most lucrative market, has been quite a pleasant experience. Sales on Android from July through October 1st have netted $2,223 in actual revenue (after Google’s cut), with the iPad version bringing in $15,013 from Jan. thru Oct. Keep in mind the iPad sales account for $5,013 in January alone (the game was still new and on sale), as well as six extra months of sales vs. the Android version.

That Android number looks substantially lower than the iPad version, yet I’d port to Android again in a heartbeat. The developer tools are so much better on that platform vs. Apple- I’m able to release new updates in just several hours vs. the days in review that Apple takes to review the app, the UI for adding achievements and viewing data is so much more developer friendly than Android, and I’m able to respond in the reviews section to dissatisfied customers instead of watching helplessly as a user states problems in the iPad reviews section without any way for me to help them. The money isn’t quite there, and as a platform I have to acknowledge that iOS will always take priority over Android since it was my main source of revenue, but I hope that disparity of revenue closes over time. I’d love to keep developing for that platform.

Android based retail platforms, however, are a different story. Eager to experiment, I tried putting the game on the Samsung marketplace, Amazon App Store, and several free-to-play experimental sites like Moriboo, all for Android. While the contracts for those retail stores prevent me from sharing hard data, I will say that in terms of sales up till today it was barely worth the day it took to port to these platforms.

The iPad has been my main source of income through October, though I haven’t done too much to really push that market. Major updates have already been posted for the game, and no advertising was done (for any version of the game, actually). Temporary price cuts in April ($2.99 for a week, down from $4.99) and July ($3.99) resulted in a small bump, but nothing substantial. Aside from the terrific $5,067 in sales in January, the year has been pretty small as a whole (the lowest being $674 in September). It was a far cry from my expected >$3k in sales a month. But then again, I did little to really push the game in any major way like I did with the DLC updates in January. You get back what you put in, most of the time.

Desktop Performance

Over on the PC/Mac/Linux side, things were similarly slow. Sales from Jan. through October were around $3,600 total just from my website alone (other websites that sold the game contributed an additional $600 for the same timeframe). In June, I was offered the opportunity to be in the Humble Store widget, a great platform for indie devs to sell their game through a trusted merchant (this was not the stand alone Humble Store that’s available now, but rather the widget devs can use on their own websites).

While the game didn’t benefit from any Humble exposure at the time since the HS didn’t exist yet, it showed that by simply using their service, it would help increase revenue. Sales were double than what they were using BMT Micro, and while admittedly that’s not a whole lot, it’s pretty interesting when there’s virtually no change in awareness for the game. I dropped BMT Micro from handling CSD transactions and the Humble widget added an additional $2,100 from June through Oct. I hope to continue using the Humble Store services for all my future games.

Sales through October

Total sales from January through October resulted in $22,624 from mobile and desktop, which means since its release on October 2012 I’ve made about $34k in revenue from the game. Spending around $9-10k total on the game, that’s a $24k profit, which sounds pretty good on paper… however, I had already quit my job in December to focus on games full time, which meant this was my only source of revenue (my other games contributed less than $2k total in the same timeframe). What this meant was my next game would have a small budget as well, and would once again be the make-or-break game for me… if my next project wasn’t a breakout hit, I’d have to go back to work on something other than game making.

And then something happened that would pretty much change my life forever.

Greenlight

One morning I woke up to an email: my game, Cook, Serve, Delicious! was Greenlit. I was angry. This was a fairly legit looking email, but it had to be spam or some sort of scam, because I wasn’t even close to the top 100 for Greenlight (up to that point, Steam was only accepting 8-10 games per month or so). But I went to the Greenlight page anyways to see what could be going on…and there it was. The acceptance banner that the game was indeed Greenlit, along with nearly a hundred other games.

I was floored. I couldn’t believe it. It was truly like winning the lottery. I was so excited I was shaking uncontrollably. Holy crap. I’m on Steam. I’M ON STEAM! After being rejected three times with the Oil Blue by Steam, here was my next game, nearly a year later, being approved by Steam.

Once I calmed down, I went into strategy mode. I realized that I would be competing with these other hundred games that were approved alongside me. I quickly ran through all the games and determined which ones were finished and ready to distribute like mine was, and which were still in early concept/alpha phase. Some games were finished, but the devs didn’t acknowledge their Greenlight acceptance even days after it was awarded to them, so I figured those games wouldn’t be on Steam very soon. Thankfully, the engine I was using (Game Maker Studio) was fully equipped with Steam APIs for Achievements, Cloud and Leaderboard support, so I read up and started working like crazy to get my game set up for Steam.

Other games launched ahead of mine, and I took note of their release strategies. One dev refused to give Steam keys to people who got the game via a bundle which lead to a lot of backlash in the Steam forums, so I immediately offered keys on Desura, my website and Humble Store for current owners. Other devs released their game with no extra Steam support, and some Steam community members were a bit put off. They had beat me to release, but at the cost of not fully embracing the Steam platform. I had one chance to launch on Steam, and damn if I was gonna just throw my game up there without making it the best I possibly could.

The game was priced originally at $8.95, however Steam recommended a $9.99 pricepoint to better fit with the large selection of games. With that price raise I decided that not only would I be supporting Steam features, but would also add things that I felt should have been there at launch such as Key Binding support. I was worried about the potential backlash of the $1 increase, but I have yet to hear a single complaint. I think the fact that I fully backed my game up with new content and Steam APIs helped quite a bit.

The Steam Launch

On October 8th, 2013, just a few days shy of one year since CSD officially launched, the game landed on Steam. And in just one day, I had made nearly $15,000 in gross sales, which was almost as much as I made in the entire last year on PC/Mac/Linux for CSD. In two days, I surpassed it. In one week, I had made over $50,000 in gross revenue… more than I did in the last three years as a game maker and barista. My family couldn’t believe it. I couldn’t believe it. Finally, I felt redeemed. This was a path that was more than a dozen years in the making, but I had finally made it.

But man, Steam was just getting started. I participated in the November Steam sale and had triple the revenue of my daily income even with the game at 50% off. The December Steam sale came and saw similar sales.

I woke up one morning in December to a mess of Twitter replies. My game, at 4am that morning, had been chosen for a Flash Sale during the Steam Winter Sale at 75% off. I was a mess of emotions: I had no idea that was gonna happen, and was I really ready to have my game sell that low? (I had put in the 75% offer to Steam, so I knew it was possible, but you don’t know if you’re picked). Would my sales crash afterwards, with people not wanting to buy the game anymore after it was so cheap?

I frantically looked at my sales data. Only a few hundred dollars it seemed, hmmm, maybe people just aren’t that interested in the game. Then I realized Steam froze all data at 4am the moment it went on sale. I had no idea how it was doing.

I was excited, until I realized I had told some people earlier on Steam and Twitter that they should buy the game at 50% off since CSD wasn’t chosen for a Flash Sale. I felt terrible, and quickly posted in the forums that it was completely my fault, and I would be more than happy to buy a game for them on Steam should they feel that they were mislead, as they certainly were, albeit by accident. That seemed to calm some folks down, but surprisingly no one took me up on it. That offer still stands, by the way.

The sale ended at 12 noon. I checked the data…$6,000 sold, a nearly 6x increase from yesterday. That’s pretty darn good! Wait…that’s only the data from 4 to 5am. As I kept refreshing, the sales kept rolling in. Thankfully I had to leave the house with visiting family to do some stuff, which kept me from frantically clicking the refresh button.

We stopped by Schlotzsky’s later that day for lunch, which was great since I don’t own a smartphone, had my iPod with me, and they have Wi-Fi. My sister and I stood in line as I quickly connected online and got to the sales page.

Over $50,000 gross was made in just under eight hours. Over 20,000 copies sold in that timeframe. 20,000! My last game, the Oil Blue, has yet to break 1,000 copies sold in the last three years since release.

“I’m buying lunch.”

After Effects

I wasn’t sure how the game would sell after the Flash sale. My thoughts were it would go down dramatically since it was so cheap for those few hours, but as it turned out they actually doubled in daily revenue since the flash sale up until the December sale was over.

I wasn’t sure how sales would go after the big holiday extravaganza, but as it turns out after a week or so sales went back to my normal revenue I was making before the sale. Insane.

Not only that, but sales on other platforms increased during the Steam launch, with Android bringing in over $3,000 since October 2013 and iOS bringing in over $5,000 in the same timeframe.

The flux in sales for iOS (top) and Android (bottom)

People are still discovering the game, and every week it seems a new YouTube personality picks it up and the game gets a spike in interest. It’s the perfect streaming game for sure, and it’s hilarious to see everyone’s first rush hour.

Steam Total

So the total so far for Steam? After the normal revenue share and such, I’ve made over $130,000 in just three months on Steam. Typing that number still makes me shake my head. That’s impossible! No way. No. Way.

The grand total of units sold across all platforms is 52,539. That’s so much larger than anything I could have imagined, and so far daily sales average around 40-60 copies sold per day across all platforms (excluding sales/major promotional days).

PC and iOS were the big winners for me, but Linux is by far the least, with only one copy sold on the Ubuntu store and a little more than a thousand on Steam. It will be interesting to see if the Steam Machines and Steam OS will help improve Linux penetration.

What’s Next?

The future of Cook, Serve, Delicious! is winding down, but not quite over. Today I’ve launched an iPhone 5/iPod Touch 5 version of CSD, which was mainly done for fun and not really advertised in any major way. It should be interesting to see how that does, as I’m hoping for at least $500 in sales this month from that version alone.

I’ve also looked into porting CSD onto consoles, but that has been a fruitless endeavor. Talking with various “porting” studios, one wanted to port the game but felt a massive retooling was needed to make the game much easier and friendlier to casual gamers. NOPE. (that was especially odd to hear given that they’ve ported over a lot of hardcore/challenging games to Playstation systems.)

Another company, despite one of the devs in that company really enjoying the game and wanting the higher ups to get back with me, never did. One dev team was eager to do it, but lacked the reverse engineering to make it a simple port, which would mean they’d have to code it from scratch…a significantly difficult task that would involve too much of my time at this point since I’m already looking towards my next game.

It doesn’t look like the game will be ported to consoles, which at this point I’m ok with, since I’m already making plenty of money on Steam and ready to move on to new games. It was going to be more of a fun release, but what can I do at this point.

The Future

With the money made on Steam I’ve been able to boost the budget of my next game by nearly four times the original amount, allowing me to bypass Kickstarter and Early Access so that I can make a fully complete game. I hope to debut the game in March, and I feel this game has an opportunity to be a huge release, but only if I can make it a great game of course. I think I can do it.

If you’ve read all my previous “How Much do Game Devs Make” articles spanning the last few years, you know how hard it’s been to get where I am today. Most of the time I wanted to quit. There were times when I had to go back to work since games weren’t supporting me financially. Times that I didn’t have a plan B, and that really terrified me, because I didn’t want to do anything else in my life but make games. Now I can.

Or at least, I can for the immediate future. You’re only as good as your last game, after all.(source:gamasutra)

 


上一篇:

下一篇: