作者：Nicholas Lovell

所有的主机制造商都需要获得更大的安装基础。尽管索尼和微软都投身于这一代的主机中，但是他们仍希望更多主机可以走进用户的起居室而为他们带来更多利益。主机在发行时并不能够赚钱，其大多数收益是源自游戏发行商的版税费以及平台上电子下载和在线服务收益的抽成。

这些模式都需要大量的用户。这并不是一个赢者通吃的市场，从金融术语来看，它就像是一个受到操作而旋转的齿轮。想象你花费一年时间并投入10亿美元去运行一个主机业务。其中包含市场营销，基础设施，零售团队等等内容。让我们想象它的成本高达10亿美元，不管你是拥有零安装基础还是1亿安装基础。事实上，这都不可能是真的。当你需要销售并支持更多主机时，你便需要投入更多费用。但是用户也会付钱给你。我们需要在此讨论的是运行一个主机业务的固定成本基础，而不是取决于所拥有的用户数的可变成本。

以下图表中，横线是关于运行一个主机业务的固定成本。在左边，收益线低于固定成本，即代表主机制造商面临亏损。而在右边，收益线高于固定成本，也就代表着他们正在赚取利益。可以说几乎所有主机制造商在发行时都处于“亏损”的状态。甚至是是任天堂，这个在发行时也能保证每个Wii都能赚取利益的制造商在运行主机平台时也面临大量的固定开支。

chart（from gamesbrief）

对于任何制造商来说，年度收益超过年度固定成本便是一个重要时刻。（更确切地说，首席财务官重视的是年度净收益何时才能超过固定成本）。在此之后其业务在现金流基础上便是有利可图的。如果算上预发行的之处以及之前的损失的话，这可能还未能赚回本，但是该业务的确不会再大出血了。

微软和索尼都知道这点。他们都希望能够尽快到达那个点。为了达到积极的财政结果，他们承受着来自股东的巨大压力。最后两个主机周期并不会为制造商带来利益。时间不再站在他们那一边了。

所以微软和索尼必须想尽办法尽快提高安装基础和每用户收益。而他们为此采取的是两种不同的策略。

微软认为发行商是关键。他们制定了限制二手销售和一天一次的确认等政策去吸引那些对二手销售抱怨连连的游戏发行商们。微软也拿出了支票去维持与其他内容提供者（游戏邦注：如NFL和Stephen Spielberg）的关系。这一策略将内容当成主要战场，并且是基于它们是最佳内容的假设，认为如果能够提供给内容提供者最友好的平台，玩家便会陆续涌向Xbox One。

索尼则认为玩家才是关键。他们并未限制二手游戏。它并不是一个一体化媒体中心（尽管它的确拥有许多媒体中心功能）。他们往最赚钱的二手游戏市场投掷了一条求绳索，从而与许多零售商能够展开合作。索尼的策略是，如果能够获得安装基础，那么发行商便会涌向用户所在的区域（不管他们是喜欢有限抵换还是DRM友好型Xbox One），他们也能够赚取利益。

对于这两个平台来说，内容和用户都很重要。而对于他们所采取的不同策略，微软所强调的是“如果我们拥有内容，用户自然就会跟过来”；而索尼则专注于“如果我们拥有用户，内容自然就会出现。”

所以到底内容是王道还是分销？不管何时，大多数投资者都会投给分销。如果现在让我选择的话，我会希望这些平台能够专注于提供给用户他们真正需要的，而不是琢磨内容供应商的喜好。

（本文为游戏邦/gamerboom.com编译，拒绝任何不保留版权的转载，如需转载请联系：游戏邦）

What makes a platform? Games or users? Console makers place their bets.

By Nicholas Lovell

I’m still catching up on all the news and analysis from the E3 reveals of the new consoles yesterday, but this is my current thinking.

Both console manufacturers need to get a large installed base. Although both Sony and Microsoft are committed to this generation of consoles, they still need lots of consoles in people’s living rooms to make money. The consoles are unlikely to make money at launch: most of the revenue will come from the royalty paid by publishers on each game they sell and on the share of revenue from digital downloads and online services on the platforms.

Each of those models need users. Lots of users. This is not a winner-takes-all market, but it is one that is, in financial terms, highly operationally geared. To explain that, imagine it costs you $1 billion a year to run a console business. That includes the marketing, the infrastructure, the retail teams, everything. Let us simplify and imagine that it costs $1 billion whether you have an installed base of zero or an installed base of 100 million units. In practice, that isn’t true. The more consoles you have to sell and support, the more it will cost you. But those customers are paying you money. What are really looking for here is the fixed cost base of running a console business, not the variable cost that depends on how many customers you have.

The chart below shows the fixed cost of running a console business as a straight line. On the left, where the revenue line is below the fixed cost, the console manufacturer is making a loss. Over on the right, where it is above the fixed cost, they are making a profit. Now here is the kicker: pretty well all console manufacturers are heavily in “loss-making” territory at launch. Even Nintendo, which famously made sure that it made a profit on every Wii sold even at launch, had substantial fixed overheads of running a console platform.

For any manufacturer, getting to the point where annual revenue exceeds annual fixed costs is a big moment. (More accurately, the CFO cares about when annual gross margin – after the costs of supplying the physical consoles or bandwidth for online services – exceeds fixed costs). The business is then profitable on a cashflow basis. They may still be unprofitable when you consider the pre-launch expenditure and the losses incurred up until this point, but the business is no longer haemorrhaging cash.

Microsoft and Sony know this. They are in a race to get to that moment as fast as possible. They face shareholder pressure for good financial results. The last two console cycles have not clearly made money for the manufacturers. Time is no longer on their side.

So Microsoft and Sony have to work to grow that installed base high and the revenue per user as fast as possible. And it seems to me that they are pursuing two different strategies.

Microsoft is betting that publishers are the key. Policies like restricted used sales and once-a-day validation are designed to attract game publishers who have spent years bitching about second-hand sales. Microsoft has taken out its cheque book to secure relationships with other content providers too, like the NFL and Stephen Spielberg. This strategy identifies content as the key battleground and is predicated on the assumption that if they have the best content, by offering the most friendly platform to content providers, gamers will flock to the Xbox One in droves.

Sony is betting that gamers are key. It has no used game restrictions. It is unashamedly about the games, not an all-in-one media centre (although it does have many media centre features). It has co-opted the retailers by throwing a lifeline to the highly profitable used game market. Sony’s strategy says that if we can get the installed base, the publishers will flock to where the consumers, and hence the money is, irrespective of whether they prefer the limited trade-in, DRM-friendly Xbox One.

Content is vital to both platforms. So are users. But to summarise the difference between the strategies, Microsoft is focused on “If we have the content, the users will follow”; Sony is focused on “If we have the users, the content will follow.”

So is content king, or is it distribution? Most investors would plump for distribution over content every time. If I had to pick sides now, I would go for the platform that is focusing on giving the users what they want, not the content suppliers. Over the next decade, we will see whether I am right.(source:gamesbrief)