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Pocketgamer:苹果公司有的放矢 不同产品不同策略

发布时间:2011-03-24 18:29:44 Tags:,,,

游戏邦注:本文作者为Unity业务拓展副总裁Oren Tversky,他在文中分析了苹果硬件设备在高端市场,大众市场的不同发展策略。

诺基亚与微软的联姻,显然迷惑了人们对于苹果与Android以及市场份额与利润的理解。

Android机器人军团大举挥师向前,将许多垂死挣扎的平台甩在身后。每天都有30万部以上的Android手机被激活,该平台的飞速发展正威胁新的芬-美联盟(诺基亚与微软的联姻)甚至是苹果的市场份额。

问题是,手机的市场份额对于各个公司来说到底有多大意义呢?

Unity's Oren Tversky

Unity's Oren Tversky

苹果的两种商业模式

从2010年1月到6月,苹果获得了意外的大丰收。游戏邦发现虽然苹果手机销量在全球市场只有3%的份额,但在整个市场中的利润比例却高达39%,这个对比数据着实令人瞠目。

更惊人的是,苹果仅凭两种手机型号就取得了这番成就。

所以,拥有如此丰厚的利润,苹果还需要担心它在手机市场的份额只有3-4%吗?而且它的这种运营模式在PC市场也同样奏效,MacBook系列也单凭8%的市场份额就取得相当高的利润。

然而游戏邦发现,苹果在便携式音乐播放器市场却采取了截然不同的策略,它主要追求市场份额而非利润空间,其音乐播放器设备占据了70%的市场份额,瞄准低端市场,薄利多销。

为什么苹果会采取这两种截然不同的策略呢?这和手机市场又有什么关系呢?不妨看看下文详解。

高端市场策略

苹果的高端策略并不特殊,在传统的消费品市场,许多制造商都不担忧市场份额的问题。不少高端服装厂商、高级汽车制造商及家电生产商对于公司瞄准高端市场,获得丰厚利润的现状颇为满意。想想劳斯菜斯、古琦还有Viking厨具。

这些公司丝毫不打算降低利润空间,贬低品牌价值,或者放弃他们轻松的营利模式,来迎合大众市场。

当然,经济规模和股东压力也时常让这些公司不得不顾及低端市场,梅赛德斯的C系列车型就是这种典型。然而也有许多公司挺满意现状,仍然愿意通过向有钱客户出售高价商品,获得可观的利润。

这其中有数个原因。第一,高端市场的利润相当可观,无需建立品牌或者开展营销活动来吸引大众用户。游戏邦认为,特定的高端用户数量不多,很有必要针对这一群体推出限量版的产品。

第二,品牌提高了市场准入门槛,进入低端市场会损害公司的品牌,并失去高端市场的丰厚利润。最后,限制产品样式或者SKUs(库存数量)对于研发费用、生产效率和营销活动来说是有利无弊的。

锁定优势

虽然身处高科技市场,但形势变幻莫测。许多技术市场呈现优胜者垄断的特点:1、2家公司建立起自己的绝对优势,阻碍其他竞争者进入市场。

想想微软 Windows、谷歌搜索引擎,想想Intuit的Turbo Tax。出现这种情况原因很多,但都少不了网络影响(想想Facebook),高额的转换成本(源于用户对服务的熟悉度或者数据锁定),复杂的价值链(开发商、OEM厂商),以及研发产品所需的大量人力投入等因素。

一旦Windows成为主导PC平台的标准操作系统,那么它对开发商的影响力,应用软件的兼容性,用户对于界面的熟悉度,巨额的研发费用以及企业需求等,都将成为其他竞争对手将难以超越微软的障碍因素(网页应用和新形式应用的涌现,也许将打破这种格局)。

低份额、高利润的MacBook系列

为何苹果对市场份额持有两种不同的观念?

首先,让我们来看看PC产品MacBook系列。游戏邦获悉,该产品的市场份额大约为8%。苹果和古琦、宝马应用,非常高兴自己能够从高端市场获得丰厚的利润。许多型号的MacBook零售价都超过1500英镑,而普通笔记本电脑的售价却只要200英镑。

超越微软绝非易事。迎合PC高端市场顾客的口味,还是十分有利的选择,更何况苹果已经通过其运行操作系统,掌握了发展的主动权。

而便携式MP3播放器(iPod系列)的市场却与此相反。苹果在此的市场份额高达70%,而这一点儿也不让人意外。

iTunes音乐播放应用

苹果对于iTunes市场所采取的策略自有其原因,其中有些理由也可解释iPhone市场的策略。首先最重要的一点是,作为一个保守封闭的大型平台和系统,苹果通过iTunes形成了高额的转换成本。

游戏邦发现从许多方面看来,iTunes才是销售商品,而iPod好比是促销iTunes的赠品。

其次,通过为用户创造始终如一的优质体验以及绑定iTunes,苹果可以竞争低端的市场,通过音乐的销量来弥补所受损失。

游戏邦认为苹果深知销售iPod的相关附件(高利润),可以为其带来额外的收入。

MP3播放器用途纷繁复杂,从飞机旅途到健身房运动均可见其踪影。这个市场已有大量不同产品,其中有些产品(如Nano)注定无法走高价路线。重点是,苹果在MP3市场无法仅凭3%的市场份额,创造40%的利润,这个市场份额也无法使iTunes成为苹果最有利的竞争筹码。(本文为游戏邦/gamerboom.com编译,转载请注明来源:游戏邦)

Unity’s Oren Tversky analyses Apple’s different hardware strategies

In the first of a two part column, Oren Tversky, Unity’s vice president of business development discusses Apple’s hardware strategies in terms of a luxury market and a mass market.

Lost in the machinations of the Nokia-Microsoft alliance is a related story about Apple and Android, and market share and profits.

It’s just as important. As the Android robot marches forward it is leaving a trail of dying platforms in its wake. With more than 300,000 activations a day, Android’s market share threatens to overwhelm not just the newly minted Finno-American axis, but perhaps Apple as well.

The question is, just how much does market share in the mobile phone industry matter?

Big pie, big slice

From January through June of 2010, Apple produced a remarkable financial windfall. With a global market share of about 3 percent of the mobile phone market by unit volume, the Cupertino-based company managed to extract 39 percent of the market’s total profits. That is an astounding statistic – an insanely efficient bang for the buck.

Even more astounding: Apple accomplished this feat with just two phone models.

So, with those numbers, should Apple care that its market share in mobile phones is only at 3-4 percent? After all, this approach works very for its personal computer business, with its MacBook line extracting hefty margins with only an 8 percent share.

Notably though, it has taken a markedly different tack in the portable music player market, pursuing market share over pure profits – about 70 percent share with plenty of lower end models sold at lower margins.

Why has the firm pursued two such vastly different strategies? And, why does this matter for the mobile phone market? Let’s take a look.

Give me luxury

Apple’s high-end approach is not unique. In traditional consumer goods markets, many manufacturers don’t fret over market share.There are plenty of high end clothiers, luxury car manufacturers and appliance makers who are perfectly content to sell to an exclusive, high-end clientele at hefty margins. Think Rolls Royce, think Gucci, or think Viking stoves.

These companies have no interest in compromising their margins, tarnishing their brands or forgoing their cushy lifestyle to accommodate the masses.

Of course, economies of scale and shareholder pressure often nudge these companies into lower end markets. Think Mercedes and its C class line of cars. Still, plenty of companies are perfectly content, and make a very fine living, selling pricey stuff to rich people.

There are several reasons for this. First, the margins in most high end markets are large, without having to build a brand and marketing campaigns that appeal to the masses. And, in general, fewer products or product lines are necessary to address a smaller, less diverse clientele.

Brand can act as a huge barrier to entry and going down-market can hurt one’s brand and, compromise the fat margins at the high end. Finally, limiting the number of models or SKUs (stock keeping units) has huge advantages in terms of R&D costs, manufacturing efficiencies and marketing campaigns.

Locked in advantage

In high tech markets though, the situation is often different. Many technology markets exhibit winner-takes-all characteristics, in which one or two companies build such an advantage that it becomes too challenging for competitors to enter.

Think Microsoft Windows, think Google search, or think Intuit’s Turbo Tax. The reasons for this vary, but usually involve network effects (think Facebook), high switching costs (due to consumer familiarity or data lock in), complex value chains (with developers and OEM’s), and the massive R&D effort required to build products.

Once Windows became the dominant standard for PCs, then developer mindshare, software compatibility of applications, consumer familiarity with the user interface, massive R&D spend, and enterprise demand made it very difficult to dethrone Redmond.

(With the advent of web-based applications and new form factor devices, this is breaking down somewhat.)

Taking a bite

Why has Apple taken radically different approaches to the concept of market share?

First, let’s look at its personal computer line- the MacBook. With approximately 8 percent market share. Apple, like Gucci and BMW, is very happy to extract juicy profits of the top end of the market. Many of its MacBook models retail for over £1,500, at a time when £200 laptops are common.

Unseating Windows was never going to be a simple proposition. On the other hand, catering to a finicky, exclusive clientele at the high end of the personal computer market, could still be a lucrative business, especially since Apple controls its own destiny through ownership of the operating system.

Contrast this with the portable MP3 player market- the iPod line. Apple’s unit share of the portable music player market is about 70 percent – and it is no accident.

iTunes’ Trojan Horse

There were several reasons for Apple’s approach to this market, some of which apply in the case of the iPhone. First and most importantly, as a largely closed platform and system, Apple realised that it could create high switching costs through iTunes.

In many ways, iTunes, and not the iPod is the product. The iPod was just the blade given away to sell the iTunes razor. The music collections people have built up act as a sizeable barrier to entry for everybody from music streaming service to device makers and create large switching costs.

Further, through the creation of a compelling end to end user experience, and requiring iTunes, Apple could justify chasing the lower end segments of the market, because it knew that it could recoup some of the lost money through sales of music (and eventually create iTunes customers for iPhone and iPad).

Similarly, Apple also knew that it could recoup additional revenues through sales of its iPod related accessories, which carry high margins.

MP3 players are also used in a variety of fashions, from long airplane trips, to the gym. Different products are required to address the market as a whole, and some of these, the Nano for example, are unlikely to ever command high price points. The point is, the MP3 player market was not a market in which Apple could capture 40 percent of the profits with 3 percent of the market share, nor would that share have enabled it to turn iTunes into a commanding corporate asset to be wielded across the whole of its product portfolio.

Tomorrow, I’m going investigate whether the smartphone market is a winner-take-all market, like the MP3 player market, or a luxury high-end goods market, like the personal computer market.(Source:PocketGamer.biz)


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