俗话说异性相吸，企业之间的联姻也不例外，如果考虑到两家公司的经济实力差距，这一点也就更为明显。

前不久美国艺电（EA）收购英国iPhone发行商Chillingo公司一事也证明，收购一个直接的竞争对手，可以通过更多资源共享节省开支，比如说工作室、中级管理层、市场营销团队等的合并和重组，A+B得到的是综合双方优势的C，而非A+与B-相互抵消的结果。

EA-Acquires-Chillingo

尽管两家公司之间的收购成交额尚未公布，但舆论一致认为很可能在2000万美元以内（也有人猜测会与未来盈利情况相挂钩）。

Chillingo是苹果iOS平台最高产的游戏发行商，曾推出成百上千款便宜的99美元游戏和少量的高价游戏，这些游戏无论质量优劣，还是特许经营权的使用，都统一划在了Chillingo的名下。

尽管作为发行商，Chiilingo威名远扬，但从本质上讲它更像一个游戏经销商。

Chillingo主要从所发行的游戏营收中抽成盈利，并没有传统掌机游戏发行商那样的财力为游戏开发投入资金。Chillingo光凭《终极缠绕》（Zen Bound）、《怪物大战野猪男》（MiniGore）以及《愤怒鸟》（Angry Birds）等热门游戏积攒起来的名气，就够它招引来大量排队等着自己的游戏成功创收的iOS开发商。

Chillingo已经有足够的资本不断让新游戏自动找上门，Zeptolab开发的《怪物吃糖果》（Cut the Rope）面世头两周就创造100万下载量更证明了这一点，因为如果不借助Chillingo的发行力量，这款游戏在App Store中的结果很可能是走向沉寂。

虽然作为App Store高端发行商/经销商，Chillingo的地位已经无人能敌，但对EA而言，收购Chillingo真的划算吗？答案是肯定的。

在推出无数出色作品、斩获成百上千万下载量的开发商面前，EA所扮演的手机游戏开发商这一角色无疑是失败的。去年夏天EA为开拓99美分的iOS游戏市场，专门开设了一个名为“8lb Gorilla”的内部工作室，但仅开发了一款游戏便没了下文，只能悄悄关闭。

Chillingo就不同了，虽然没有多少市场营销或公关支持，却能在这一块市场玩得风生水起。这也正是EA可能仅用2000万美元低价达成交易，而引来评论家议论纷纷的原因。

作为一个游戏经销商而非发行商，Chillingo确实从来没有为游戏开发投资，也因此只能获得有限的iOS版本游戏知识产权，以及一些PSP迷你掌机游戏的发行权。

很显然，这个圈子的变化很快，新的EA律师已认可Chillingo收购交易还将包含一些附属经营权，比如说Windows Phone 7、bada、XBLA平台的游戏发行权，或者毛绒玩具的发售权等。

现在有了EA的财力和号召力撑腰，Chillingo的开发商客户很可能会提出更多要求，比如说让Chillingo为游戏开发投资，假如Chillingo还想获得更多知识产权的话。

尽管EA已宣布该公司今后业务的独立地位，但从这一市场的企业合并效应来看，EA Mobile最好为Chillingo提供500万美元的战略基金，为其打开真正的手机游戏发行市场。

这500万美元资金，足够用来生产30到40款游戏，如果再加上EA Mobile的企业公关力量和市场营销支持，Chillingo极可能向手机、便携式掌机和其他电子游戏发行平台推出更多叫好又叫座的游戏。

当然，媒体关注的重点仍然在于，被收购后的Chillingo究竟能否复制《愤怒鸟》的成功？

不太可能。《愤怒鸟》是史上最畅销的iPhone游戏，这一点很难超越。但是像《怪物大战野猪男》或者《怪物吃糖果》这类在苹果App Store创造了数百万销量的游戏，如果一个月后考虑转战五、六个平台，倒有可能为开发商和发行商创造极大的双赢。

不过，笔者倒很好奇Chillingo的前股东们为何不考虑公司将来的运营表现，没有借鉴前人收购的操作方法（比如说日本DeNA收购ngmoco公司时花了4.03亿，其中有一部分是基于未来财务表现的额外对价）。

总而言之，这个收购案再次证明异性相吸，可以让买卖双方互惠互利，成功淘金。（本文为游戏邦/gamerboom.com编译）

Opinion: The synergies that should make EA’s Chillingo deal highly profitable

When it comes to affairs of the heart, the consensus is that opposites attract.

Yet, when it comes to corporate mating, such couplings – particularly when you take into account their respective financial discrepancies – often makes sense.

Love match

While the acquisition of a direct competitor enables savings through the stripping out common services – offices, middle management, sales & marketing – A + B is more likely to result in a synergetic C than the dilution of A+ with B-.

And the former is the situation when it comes to EA Mobile’s (technically EA’s) purchase of UK iPhone publisher Chillingo.

The price hasn’t been announced but the consensus figure of $20 million cash (presumably with some sort of future bonus scheme) feels about right.

Chillingo is a proven business. It’s the most voluminous publisher for Apple’s iOS devices, mixing up hundreds of its cheap 99c Clickgamer releases with fewer higher priced games – whether due to quality of the game or use of licences – under the main Chillingo brand.

Yet, despite its publisher moniker, Chillingo is best described as a distributor.

Pipeline approach

Working on a percent revenue deal for the games it releases, Chillingo doesn’t fund development as a traditional console publisher would. Instead, it relies on its reputation, with games such as Zen Bound, MiniGore and Angry Birds sufficient to attract the myriad of iOS developers trying to gain an app discovery bonus.

It’s had enough successes to continue to attract new products, while it can point to the one million sales within the first two weeks of Zeptolab’s Cut the Rope as evidence of its sustained power to kick otherwise likely unnoticed games up the App Store ladder.

But while Chillingo’s status as the App Store’s premium volume publisher/distributor is secure, the real question is, is that enough for EA to buy it?

I $ U

Simply, the answer is yes.

EA has been a complete failure when it comes to engaging with the hundreds of independent developers releasing great games on mobile platforms that are downloaded tens of millions of times.

Indeed, this was underlined by its attempt to attack the 99c game iOS market back in the summer of 2009 when it opened an internal studio, cutely called 8lb Gorilla, to make games for this market.

Quietly, it was shuttered after one release.

Chillingo however – historically without much marketing or PR support – has picked enough winners in the sense previously best described via the music A&R or the slate operations of the movie business to be strongly profitable in a market that is now awash with M&A millions.

Indeed, for this reason, it’s the assumed low range of the assumed $20 million price tag that has gained most commentators’ comments.

Yet, as a distributor, not a publisher, Chillingo has never funded iOS titles, and hence is assumed to only have limited IP rights to iOS – and in some cases PSP Minis – game releases.

Obviously, the ecosystem is changing quickly and not doubt Chillingo’s new standard EA lawyer approved terms will encompass as many ancillary rights – whether Windows Phone 7, bada, XBLA or plush toys – as possible.

However, with the corporate and spiritual power of EA now behind it, it seems likely that Chillingo’s client developers will be asking it to do more for its dollar i.e. start funding games if it wants more IP rights.

Love you long time

So despite EA’s statement of the future independence of the company, synergies in this market would be best served with EA Mobile providing Chillingo with a say $5 million warchest to fund a real mobile game publishing business.

This would enough to produce perhaps 30-40 games, which when plugged into EA Mobile’s corporate PR and marketing machine should provide enough hits to roll out onto mobile, portable and other digital distribution platforms to a very profitable conclusion.

Obviously, topline thinking would consider whether Chillingo could replicate its release of Rovio’s Angry Birds.

Unlikely. As the best selling iPhone game ever, Angry Birds is the exception that proves the rule. But getting a MiniGore or a Cut the Rope across five or six platforms a month after proven multi million sales on Apple’s App Store would be enough to make this deal work extremely well for both parties.

Indeed, I’d be surprised if Chillingo’s ex-shareholders aren’t massively motivated by future bonuses in term of pushing the company’s future performance; financially much moreso compared to the value of the initial deal. (Remember a quarter of ngmoco’s $403 million purchase by DeNA consisted of optional payments based on future performance.)

In this case then, the sparks that fly when opposites attract (and are bought) could result in the procreation of vast amount of cash.（source:pocketgamer）