作者：Chris Bateman

在Walton的虚假表象理论中，关于特殊道具的想象便是利用机制意义去充实个体想象。尽管似乎不存在单一的连贯模式去解释这一过程的运行，但是Walton定义了两个常见的基本生成原则：现实原则（RP），基于与现实世界的共同点而创造意义；以及共同信仰原则（MBP），通过艺术家和鉴赏者所达成的战术协议创造意义。例如科幻小说和幻想故事都利用了共同信仰原则去创造故事世界中的奇幻元素。Walton利用这些原则去暗示奇幻世界中的虚构事实。

在故事和艺术中，生成原则允许简洁地阐述一个连贯的故事，或者形成一个可理解的解释。但是在游戏中，除了有意义地解决艺术或解释故事，我们还有其它需要做的。游戏不只是一种表象，它们也具有功能性。因此包含任何游戏的道具必须在某种程度上具有表象和功能性元素，而后者还必须包含游戏的主要规则，以及之所以会嵌入这些规则的背景。

举个例子来说，假设一款特殊桌面游戏的规则是要求你去洗牌，并为每个玩家派发7张纸牌。那么这个规则便很容易被理解，它是依赖于所有战术假设模式（游戏邦注：例如纸牌将被洗净并分配给不同玩家；除非出现其它情况，否则纸牌将以顺时针的方向派发给玩家）—-即基于社交模式而嵌入。Wittgenstein在《Philosophical Investigations》中便提到这点（例如一些私人规则总是没有多少道理），并且Saul Kripke也对此进行了详细的描写。因此，游戏的功能性元素是基于特定生成元素的某一组成部分。

Mario_Bros-headshots(from videogamerescue)

我们敢说在游戏的功能性元素中，RP和MBP中间有一条平行线。例如，如果一个人正在玩一款环境类电子游戏。如《马里奥》平台游戏，那么他便会意识到掉落到一个无敌沟壑是不好的情况——这与现实原则会出现的结论一样。同样地，一款《马里奥》游戏将教会玩家跳到怪物头上将其杀死，但是在现实世界中我们却不会这么对待动物——我们可以说这相当于共同信仰原则。游戏创造者使用了共同信仰去宣称某些虚构事实，在这种情况下便是关于游戏玩法和与之相随的虚假性。为什么会伴随着虚假性呢？我们会在想象中理解降落在怪物头上而“杀死”它的行为。但是从实际意义上来看，这种情况不可能出现，但是生成原则并不是用于授权理解跳到怪物头上会杀死它的行为。我们能够通过想象认为它已经被杀死。

桌面游戏中的骰子也是关于生成原则的一个有趣例子。我们总是觉得骰子只具有功能性，但这种想法却是错误的。在像《Cluedo and Monopoly》等游戏中，骰子滚动的结果将改变我们最终在游戏世界里的位置。这也拥有一种虚假意义（一种表象结果），与其功能意义紧密联系在一起。在其它游戏中这种情况会更加明显，例如在《Fighting Fantasy》的游戏书中，桌面角色扮演游戏或像《魔镇惊魂》的叙述类桌面游戏，骰子滚动的结果总是具有更明确的叙述意义。滚动骰子的结果有可能将玩家送到疯人院，而这也将玩家带进了游戏虚幻世界的表象元素中。这伴随着一种不确定性，并让骰子在桌面叙述游戏的乐趣体验中变得更加重要。

不同的玩家对于游戏表现元素的喜欢程度也不同。当然了，许多业余玩家更喜欢游戏的功能性元素（如游戏决策），但是在理解游戏设计具有虚假性时，我们也必须承认道具的功能元素仍然具有表象结果。我们不能假设表象的解释是一种纯粹的被动过程，就像坐在车上被驾驶者带着到处乱走，相反的，任何虚假游戏的参与者的心态必须是积极的，即使不能在此做出任何决策。盯着画看或者看电影都不是完全的被动活动；理解是一种独特的心理过程，我们几乎未在其它非人类物种中发现它。似乎基于决策的游戏更加依赖于玩家的大脑，主要区别是在于程度而非性质。

因此，游戏设计师将根据玩家的想象力如决定如何创造道具。如果设计师能够更多地依赖于现实选择，那么玩家便能够更轻松地理解游戏。这能够用于解释第一人称或第三人称射击游戏为何如此受欢迎，因为基于现实文化我们能够很轻松地理解手枪的意义，在赛车游戏以及赛车道具中也是同样道理。利用越多共同信仰原则的游戏版本，游戏便能够更清楚地呈现出相关活动，但是如果最终规则越复杂，那么玩家便需要发挥更多的想象力，并最终导致越少玩家愿意玩游戏。

大多数情况下，游戏设计师都了解这种权衡，即游戏沉浸式vs.游戏玩法。如果罗列出更多明确的选择系统，那么游戏便更具有游戏性，但却将失去更多沉浸感。因此，当电子游戏进入三维表象时，它们将发生巨大的改变，因为在此它们需要具有更加实在的规则以及更让人熟悉的意义。一般情况下，如果我们能够在游戏设计中使用更多现实原则，那么玩家便能更轻松地掌握游戏，并且将会吸引更多玩家前来游戏。我的同事Ernest Adams在观察陌生的电子游戏逻辑阻碍了更广泛用户的乐趣时注意到了这一点。

当游戏设计具有虚假性时，道具（而非规则）将被作为社交过程的控制点并变得更加重要，因此基于现实原则，每一种道具都将对玩家起到推动作用，而尽可能少用共同信仰原则将能帮游戏吸引更广泛的用户。对于业余玩家，他们的想象力将支持着更加深奥的游戏形式，并能更加自由地走向MBP——但是在此，游戏的吸引力却会因为过于复杂的规则而被摧毁。许多非常有趣的游戏都因为具有太过夸张的学习曲线而遭遇了盈利失败。

关于这两种原则也存在着中间立场，共同信仰最经常宣称的一个原理便成为了一大理解背景：电子游戏玩家很少需要一个健康系统进行解释，因为这已经包含于“游戏现实”中了。同样的论据也应用于游戏世界的一些奇怪行动中，如周期扫射。在战场上没有一个士兵曾经使用过这种神秘的策略！然而它却已经成为了第一人称游戏的“游戏现实”的组成部分（作为控制和视角的结果）。因此夹杂在游戏的RP和MBP原则中的生成原则将体现在玩家和创造者社区中，并影响着游戏的构建方式，我们对于游戏世界的理解以及故事和艺术的构建方式。

（本文为游戏邦/gamerboom.com编译，拒绝任何不保留版权的转载，如需转载请联系：游戏邦）

Game Design as Make-Believe: Principles of Generation

By Chris Bateman

Based upon part three of the Mimesis as Make-Believe serial.

In Walton’s make-believe theory of representation, what is prescribed to be imagined by a particular prop is fleshed out in the imagination of the individual by mechanisms of implication. Although there seems to be no single coherent pattern to how this process works, Walton identifies two basic principles of generation that commonly apply: the Reality Principle (RP), which makes implications on the basis of similarity to the real world we live in, and the Mutual Belief Principle (MBP), which makes implications via a tacit agreement between the artist and appreciator. Science fiction and fantasy stories, for instance, all deploy the Mutual Belief Principle to create the fantastic or futuristic elements of their worlds. Walton talks in terms of these principles being used to imply fictional truths in the imaginary world associated with the prop in question.

In stories and art, the principles of generation are what allow a coherent story to be told succinctly, or a comprehensible interpretation to be formed. However, in games there is more going on than just the mechanics of generation by which art is resolved meaningfully or a narrative becomes interpreted. Games are not just representational, they are also functional – the play of any given game has some functionality of play (gameplay). Thus the props that comprise any game can be resolved to some degree into both representational and functional elements, the latter being comprised principally of the rules of the game, but also the background of understanding in which those rules are embedded.

For instance, suppose the rules of a particular boardgame instruct you to shuffle the deck and deal seven cards to each player. This rule seems readily understandable – but it rests on all manner of tacit assumptions (that the cards will be shuffled and dealt face down, for instance; that the cards will be dealt out in a clockwise order left of the dealer barring any other stipulation) – all of which are socially embedded. Wittgenstein makes this point (i.e. that there is little plausibility in private rules) in Philosophical Investigations, and it has been gainfully elaborated by Saul Kripke.Thus, even the functional aspects of a game depend in part upon certain principles of generation.

We could venture to say that there are parallels to RP and MBP in the functional aspects of games. For example, if one is playing an environmental videogame such as a Mario platform game, one generally recognises that falling into an apparently bottomless ravine is not a good idea – a conclusion reached by something akin to the Reality Principle. Similarly, when a Mario game teaches the player (as depicted above) that jumping on the head of a monster slays it – something which is not generally true of animals in the real world! – we can say that something equivalent to the Mutual Belief Principle is in effect. The makers of the game use mutual belief to assert certain fictional truths – in this case concerning both the gameplay and the accompanying make-believe. Why is make-believe involved? We interpret the act of landing on the monster as “killing” it in our imagination. Pragmatically, all it does is disappear from view, but the principles of generation are not generally taken as licensing an interpretation that jumping on a monster makes it invisible before it runs off, say. We are prescribed to imagine it has been killed.

The use of dice in boardgames is a particularly interesting case in respect of principles of generation. It is tempting to say that the dice are solely functional – but this can be misleading. In games like Cluedo and Monopoly, the result of the die roll changes where we end up in the game world. It has a make-believe implication (a representational consequence) that is closely connected with its functional meaning. This becomes even more explicit in other games: in a Fighting Fantasy gamebook, a tabletop role-playing game or a narrative boardgame like Arkham Horror, the outcome of die roles have explicit narrative (i.e. representational) meanings: this makes the die roll representational in its own way. The outcome of the die roll might send an adventurer to the Asylum, say, and that invests the player in the representational elements of the fictional world of the game as they roll the dice. It is the accompanying uncertainty about what will happen which make dice so crucial to the enjoyment of tabletop narrative games.

Different players enjoy the representational elements of a game to very different degrees. Certainly, many gamer hobbyists are much more interested in the functional elements of play (in the decisions of play, if you like), but in understanding game design as make-believe it is important to acknowledge that the functional elements of props (the rules, and also more than this) still have representational consequences. Neither should one assume that the interpretation of representations is a purely passive process, like being driven around in a car – on the contrary, the mind of the participant in any game of make-believe is most definitely active, even if there are no decisions to be made. Looking at a painting or watching a movie is not a wholly passive activity; comprehension is a distinct mental process, one barely developed in non-human species. It may be true that decision-based play is more demanding upon the player’s brain, but the distinction is one of degree and not of kind.

Consequently, game designers face interesting decisions concerning how they create their props from the point of view of the imagination of the players. The more the designer can rely on the Reality Principle, the easier the game will be for players to understand. This helps explain the comparative popularity of the first or third person shooter, since the gun is a prop whose implications are very well understood in our culture, and the same goes for racing games and car-props. The more the game-version of the Mutual Belief Principle is deployed, the more expressly game-like (i.e. decision-like) a play activity is likely to become, but the more complex the resulting rules the more imagination is required for play – and thus the fewer players will be able to play.

Game designers are, for the most part, well aware of this kind of trade-off, which is sometimes couched in terms of arguemtns of the immersion versus gameplay kind. The more an explicit system of choices is laid out, the more game-like the play will seem, but the less immersive it is likely to feel. Thus videogames went through a significant sea change when they moved into three dimensional representations precisely because it allowed for less abstract rule-dictations (MBP) and more familiar implications (RP). In general terms, the more the Reality Principle can be used in a game design, the easier the game will be to learn and the more players can enjoy it. My colleague Ernest Adams touched upon this point in observing that the strange logic of videogames (destroy boxes to regain health by finding hidden power-ups, for instance) serves as a barrier to their enjoyment by a wider audience.

In game design as make-believe, where the props (and not the rules) are intended to be the focus of the design process, it becomes important therefore to think about each prop in terms of what the Reality Principle is likely to suggest to players, and to deploy the Mutual Belief Principle (in the form of explicit rules, and otherwise) as rarely as possible in games seeking the widest possible audience. For gamer hobbyists, whose greater imagination supports more esoteric forms of play, there is greater leeway to move towards MBP – but even here, a game’s appeal can be stopped dead by excessively complex rules. Too many fundamentally enjoyable games fail commercially because of too steep a learning curve.

There is also a middle ground between these two, as what is most frequently asserted by Mutual Belief becomes part of the background of understanding: players of videogames rarely need a health or hit point system explaining to them because in “gamer reality” this is already implied. A similar argument applies in the case of bizarre actions in game worlds, such as circle strafing. No soldier on the battlefield has ever performed such an arcane manoeuvre! Yet it has become part of the “gamer reality” of first person games (as a consequence of the controls and the perspective). Thus between the RP and MBP of games lie principles of generation that are socially embodied in the community of game players and game makers, and which affect the way in which games are constructed as fundamentally as our understanding of the world affects the way that stories and art are constructed.(source:kotaku)