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设计师需警惕霸权商品破坏游戏体验

发布时间:2012-10-01 08:19:44 Tags:,,,

作者:Ramin Shokrizade

根据商品和服务在市场中的行为及消费者选择它们的方式,当代微经济理论将其分为“廉价”、“中等”及“奢华”三类。关于背离市场期望的商品话题也引发了不少有趣的讨论,例如“吉芬商品”(指价格下降后收入的负效应相当大)和“炫耀性商品”。

本文旨在为这些“真实”世界中稀有的非直观商品介绍一种全新模式,这些商品是在网络游戏销售中最常见的类型:霸权商品。

microtransactions(from scottjen.wordpress.com)

microtransactions(from scottjen.wordpress.com)

自2001年起,我开始研究微交易盈利模式,并发现它激发了霸权商品的出现。目前,微交易是在线游戏收费的首选方式,也是Zynga和Nexon这类大型公司直接出售内容的唯一方式(不包括间接盈利渠道,比如广告)。

微交易包括出售特定的虚拟商品或服务,它有别于简单的一次性付费或订阅。通常每款游戏中都有上百项微交易内容向玩家开放服务,大多数情况下,进行微交易的玩家更容易实现游戏目标。

催生了“花钱取胜”一词。而无需付费的游戏则被称为 “免费游戏”。

“黄金入场券”方案

假设我有一个滑雪场,并且经营着18台缆车,每张日常通用缆车票定价为50美元,可以让乘客坐无数趟(只能一次使用)。每天我可以售出2000张这类车票。新来的营销顾问想出了一个增加利润的好办法:将其称为“黄金入场券”。黄金入场券允许持票者可以独家享用任何一趟缆车。任何乘坐此趟缆车的通用票持有者将会被护送到下一个行程。只要我每个收费1万美元,我就能让每天的10万美元收入增加到18万美元(甚至更多)。

计划实施的第一天,效果十分可观。我们卖出了5张黄金入场券和2000张通用票券,赚取了15万美元,同比之前上涨50%!到了第二天,奇怪的事情发生了:我们只卖出4张黄金入场券和1600张通用票券,获利12万美元,效益不如第一天可观,但同旧盈利模式相比,仍取得明显的改善。

到了本周最后一天,我们跌入最低谷,只卖出3张黄金入场券和200张通用票券,获利4万美元!?怎么会这样?

通用票持有者会对被撞事件感到非常不便,这也降低了他们眼中缆车票的价值。更糟的是,他们会因不知何时受到碰撞而感到紧张。

对于购买者而言,他们的时间更加宝贵,即使我们免费发放通用票,这种不便也足以令他们不愿再靠近我们的滑雪场。富足的滑雪者可能会支付1万美元,他们能体会到同他人一道滑雪和遇见新朋友的部分乐趣,所以他们并不渴望使用黄金入场券。

对于购买黄金入场券的用户而言,这种新奇物品很快就过时,所以极少出现重复购买者。而大手笔的消费者实际上是为了享受观赏被驱逐出滑雪场的人们的表情,随着通用票持有者的数量和热情降低,这种刺激感也逐渐减弱。虽然这种环境让他们有机会遇见同类人(黄金入场券持有者),这些人更倾向于独自滑雪(毕竟,这就是他们付费的原因),所以他们与同类人的社交互动性基本为零。

黄金入场券就是霸权商品的一个例子。霸权商品,指的是一款产品或一项服务,它会降低同个领域所有其他相关商品和服务(包括自身)的价值。霸权商品最初是为了获取高额利润,但是一段时间后,消费者开始擅长识别含有这一元素的任何盈利模式。这就会导致引入霸权商品的优势自动消失。以下为两个例外情况:

1.某种环境中的所有产品都包含霸权商品元素,

2.玩家认为需强制购买某种商品。

第一种情况的典型事例为中国的网络游戏,或者Facebook游戏。美国出售SUV(运动型多功能汽车)是第二种情形的典型事例。在这种情况下,购买者自认为买下不公平(无需依赖技术)的耐受性商品比未购买SUV的人更占优势。

虽然SUV的扩散导致驾车危险度提高,但是大多数美国消费者认为购买汽车是不得不为之举。因此为了竞争(生存),他们背负着极大的压力购买了SUV。当SUV充斥整条马路时,购买时的最初安全优势开始贬值,因为两辆SUV追尾比两辆小汽车追尾来得更加危险。所以,SUV是真实世界中稀有存在的霸权商品,而且它不会自动消失(至少不会因为安全问题消失)。

基于微交易模式的游戏

这类产品总是被冠以在线“免费体验”游戏。多人游戏鼓励玩家之间的竞争,无论是注册还是被付费者打败,游戏均不收取任何费用。这种不可取的结果来自多种原因,所以不想购买胜利的玩家会离开这些产品,转而寻求类似服务。

一般来说,多人游戏都是在服务器上进行,每个服务器都具有独特的体验环境。对于这些服务器上的玩家来说,当忠实的消费者试图比他人花更多钱时,情况就开始不妙了。。

当“赢家”取决于玩家消费多寡时,盈利活动会迅速接近消失,服务器也无人问津。为适应这种情况,每隔几周,亚洲微交易模式会定时开启新型服务器,它允许死服务器上的玩家在新服务器上重新开始游戏进程。除非你打算在下个服务器上“付出最高费用”,否则整个进程有时明显毫无起色,消费者也会慢慢理解玩不是赢的唯一途径,并渐渐适应这一趋势。

目前,Facebook上的多人游戏明显在跟随上段所描述的趋势。虽然没有公司愿意出具内部数据,我能够确认,通过开发者在GDC2012上的讨论,这种方案已在亚洲和西方的中核社交网络游戏中体现出来。

《FarmVile》(Zynga基于其它一些产品开发的游戏)这类单人游戏,因在社交网络上运行而被定义为Facebook上的“社交游戏”。它们包含大量的反社交元素,比如垃圾邮件,所以我才将这类产品归为“社交网络游戏”。

由于这些游戏限制了玩家之间的互动,所以无法通过购买直接破坏其他玩家(并未支付如此多费用的玩家)的体验。然而,社交网络游戏的设计营造一定量的“嘿,看我做了什么”的境况,以此激发同龄人之间的竞争。所以,出售游戏目标是一种较轻度的霸权商品(除非社交网络中的同僚压力极其紧张),那样你可以通过“SUV效应”提高销售量。

starbuck_by_diablo(from news.mmosite.com)

starbuck_by_diablo(from news.mmosite.com)

游戏霸权商品的发展历史

我记得游戏行业中首个霸权商品事例来自2001年我协助Nexon开发的《Shattered Galaxy》(首款MMORTS大型多人即时战略游戏)。这可能是有史以来最广泛的beta测试大型多人在线游戏(考虑到它的复杂性)。显然, Nexon可能决定放弃它的首款美国游戏,再次注重亚洲开发项目,所以这款游戏添加了超强的单位以赚取额外收益。它在Nexon将其转交给第三方前,迅速为Nexon注入了一笔短期资金。

Nexon宣告了这一举措获得成功,并宣布成为首家使用微交易的游戏公司,继续开发了MMO热门游戏《冒险岛》。直到现在,Nexon仍很重视微交易及霸权商品。当时,亚洲玩家手头并不如现在阔绰,微交易为他们提供了较低的初始价格点。这两大特征让微交易在亚洲成了比无限制的订阅系统更加有效的盈利模式。

由于缺乏与西方相同的公平竞争精神,东方玩家对霸权商品并没有那么反感,2005年至今,霸权商品已成为亚洲(除了日本)市场的普遍现象。

与此同时,西方MMO项目难以管理虚拟世界中出现的真实货币转帐被黑客利用的问题。虽然这一现象并非仅起源于中国,但多数黑客攻击行为确实来自该地区。

这些行为迅速破坏了虚拟世界的经济模式,让游戏的趣味性逐步减少。而西方订阅模式的游戏缺乏差别定价和灵活的价格点,这也进一步削弱了西方MMO的利润。

结果,在2003年至2011年发行的基于订阅模式的英语MMO游戏遭遇了极高的失败率。只有极端例外的产品(游戏邦注:比如《魔兽世界》、《EVE Online》和《City of Heroes》)在这一时期表现良好。其它产品(数量太多就不举例)要么迅速下架,要么为了打捞一些额外利润,及时转化为微交易盈利模式。

必须记住,《EVE Online》和《City of Heroes》这两款游戏均通过订阅模式获利,而最近几年,它们也增添了微交易盈利模式。《魔兽世界》通过对扩展内容收费来提升利润。

霸权商品动态

如果人人都购买相同的霸权商品,那么它不再为霸权商品,因为没人可以从中获得利益。这种情形的交易模式应称为“内容购买”。当某人可以在短时间内累积购买多种霸权商品时,他就能占领更大的优势。

一些游戏开发商,比如IGG就曾在《Galaxy Online》中推广霸权商品。

虽然这对我的调查极其有用,因为我正努力理解霸权商品动态,但是奇怪的是有些公司认为这种方式可以增加他们的收益。

如果你观察他们整个盈利计划,很明显,他们似乎正试图复制类似拉斯维加斯赌场的盈利方式。拉斯维加斯一般不会阻止他人赢钱——至少不会在老虎机上动手脚,所以他们并未通过霸权商品获利。

以我经验看来,当一个玩家花费5000美元在一个游戏服务器上沉浸数周时间时,这并不会激发其他玩家做出同样行为。这只会让大量玩家进入一个“观察”状态,即等待游戏开启下个全新服务器,以便逃脱当前服务器上的不公平破坏元素。

同样,如果游乐园想卖票给队伍前面的顾客,它需谨慎确保其他人(指已排队1或2小时的顾客)不会碰到VIP插队事件。如果这项服务收取足够的费用,那么它将产生短期收益,但从长远看来,这是一项亏损策略。迪斯尼的Fastpass系统就是典型例子——它的设计已经很注重免费性与公平性。

我已经开发出大量先进且直观的盈利模式,它们完全避免了微交易与“花钱获胜”产生的问题,而对于局限在微交易的人群,我会提供许多优化这一模式的规则:

不要让玩家无限次地使用微交易。如果你允许玩家反复购买加速50%的道具,他们便有可能连续购买40个boost。而这就像哥斯拉(游戏邦注:日本人所创造的怪兽电影系列中的主角)践踏东京一样可怕。

要简化价格列表,让初学者一目了然。如果你能阅读《大不列颠百科全书》获取乐趣,那么我们提供的任何一款游戏都无法让你感到愉快,

提供多种零售价,但须时刻确保你提供的选项维持在一定的数量内。如果我需要两天的时间才能浏览完你们增值服务商店的所有道具,我会感到非常疲劳。记住,这是游戏,不是百货商品目录。

让玩家通过自己的努力去挣得游戏内容。没有人希望看到一个新玩家携带自己花了六个月才挣得的游戏道具。同样,如果玩家能够先通过自己的努力去争取某些道具再掏腰包,而不是一开始就付费,他们便会觉得自己更有威望。所以开发者最好能够让玩家在购买商品前先自己努力看看。

虚拟商品的价值会随着时间发展而变化。游戏商品将会贬值,但也有些商品却不会。而为何会出现这种情况是一个非常复杂的问题,分析服务应用并不能为你提供这个问题的答案。

推动微交易模式游戏化——只有专家能够使用。将微交易当成是一种战略性决策。你可以限制玩家购买商品的频率,或赋予每个加速道具一定的缺点。但是这个规则相对复杂些,所以你最好在履行了前面5个规则后再来考虑这一点。

具体案例

因为我只能找到遵从我建议限制霸权商品法则的盈利/游戏设计的两个最近例子(我认为我在2001年设计的《Shattered Galaxy》含有相似元素),所以我打算以此两例展开讨论。我将举出一反例,虽然它因品质和热门题材取胜,但它几乎打破了我提出的每条法则。

首先是Wargaming.net制作的《坦克世界》。这款游戏允许玩家通过订阅购买提升经验值及每场战役中获得的金币量。由于每位玩家都能订阅,而且只有一次的机会(不能累加),所以我们认为这种订阅是“公平的”。我们可以购买使用一些付费坦克,但这种情况优劣并存,所以我们认为这种购买也是“公平的”。

玩家可以现金购买弹药,但我采访的所有玩家均认为它对游戏的影响不足以定义为“不公平”。游戏中最高级的坦克需花更多的修理费,而这远远多于从战斗中挣得的金币,所以一段时间后,玩家必须购买额外货币来支持游戏进程。

game-premium-tank-usa(from worldoftanksguide.com)

game-premium-tank-usa(from worldoftanksguide.com)

如果所有级别的坦克都出现在所有战斗中(因为付费者会掌控更大的坦克),那么玩家会认为此做法不公平,但因为《坦克世界》的设计理念是让参与战斗的玩家与相同级别坦克的玩家匹配对抗,每场战役就保持了游戏的公平性。因此,付费者会获得更大的坦克,但只能与持有大坦克的其他付费者对抗,所以此游戏并没有滥用付费的优势。

《坦克世界》从来不会以过多定价决策为难用户,其中最复杂的选项也只是让玩家从6个坦克升级功能中挑选一个。

开发者已经清楚地解释了所有选项。没有任何一位玩家可以在未获得一辆坦克的情况下就直奔最大型的坦克。所以这符合我关于“通过努力获得游戏内容”的定义。由于《坦克世界》中的商品价值稳定,所以没有必要进行“促销”,付费玩家也无需因为之后的商品价格降低而感到郁闷。这款游戏保持了公平性。

《坦克世界》的游戏进程中涉及小组合作(必须同组员合作争取胜利),这是一种强烈的社交强化作用。同时,《坦克世界》还有一个间接“公平”的PvP模式,这也是一个很有力的强化作用。这就是非常有效的结合。如果玩家认为合作游戏 “不公平”(一个玩家霸占了所有的分数),或者认为PvP “不公平”(无关技能原因,玩家无法打败一个或多个对手),那么这些因素就会让参与者反感。也就是说,如果你没有考虑到霸权商品的影响,就复制了这种设计类型,那么最终结果只会适得其反。

《坦克世界》恰当地处理了这一问题,并且明显取得巨大成功。实际上,这种成功性促使Wargaming.net开发了另外两款游戏,《World of Warplanes》和《World of Warships》,这两款游戏均运用同样的游戏设计和盈利元素。

下个例子为Riot Games开发的《英雄联盟》。它的游戏机制同《坦克世界》一样,涉及以团队为基础的具有平衡性的交感PvP。相较于《坦克世界》战斗中15比15的规模,《英雄联盟》的规模较小,依据地图大小,每组只含3或5名成员。《英雄联盟》是画面并不逼真,然而游戏进程十分紧张,玩家战败后,你会获得比《坦克世界》更少的暂停时间,因为你的角色短时间内便可复活。

league of legends_Champions(from sarcasticgamer.com)

league of legends_Champions(from sarcasticgamer.com)

玩家花钱主要是为了解锁游戏中的Champion。《英雄联盟》中设置100多位Champion。每天会有些Champion免费供玩家选择,但是这种“免费”Champion是轮流的,因此如果你想经常使用中意的Champion,那么你必须通过付费才可解锁这一角色。价格大约为8美元,允许你以较低优惠价格一次性购买20位Champion。为提高销售量,游戏也会对一些不受待见的Champion进行打折。

这种方式本质上称为购买“付费内容”,只要所有Champion的价值保持平衡,游戏中就不会产生霸权商品。为了促进销售,游戏会定期引入新式Champion,它们比老式Champion略胜一筹。

为了更具竞争性,游戏一般会鼓励玩家使用新式Champion,这相当于轻微的霸权商品。由于Riot谨慎地保持了游戏的平衡性,所以社区玩家并不认为这种情况过度不公平。如果新Champion变得更加强大,那么投入之前Champion的公平性便会消失,现存玩家便会开始拒绝这款产品。

每一回合的Champion级别从1级到18级不等。但是回合间的这些级别不具连续性。初级用户可以从1级上升到30级,但是它的利益相对适中。Riot兜售的经验加速功能允许玩家加快升级过程,但由于这种优势相对适中,所以玩家并不认为这种方式“不公平”——所以用户不认为加速道具为霸权商品。同时,玩家还可以购买符文,但由于它的优势有限,所以玩家认为这是轻微且可容许的霸权商品。

战斗的胜利主要取决于玩家对自己及对手的强弱项的了解。假如现在有100多位Champion,这对于新手而言,很难了解所有Champion的技能,但是整个游戏过程却相当容易理解,所以玩家可以接受这种模式。因为玩家通常总会最先购买自己最期待的英雄,其它额外购买的实用性便会降低。那么此模式就不再适用,且会因此错失扩大盈利的机会。

《英雄联盟》在Metacritic上获得78分,以及它尤为简单的游戏机制,这款游戏很快拥有3200万注册用户,并且玩家数量迅速扩大,游戏覆盖世界多个地区。由于这款游戏实际表现远胜于Metacritic的评价,所以我将此归结为游戏在减少霸权商品上的谨慎操作。这有可能是因为开发团队中加入了许多硬核玩家,而这是Riot Game招聘时考虑的一个问题。他们对霸权商品的问题多少都有一定了解。

最后要谈的是Online Warmongers Group开发的《War Inc. Battle Zone》,这款通过Steam发布的游戏看起来制作预算很庞大。开发者将其描述为“最现实、最具战略性的部落战斗经历,是史上拥有最具深度定制系统的在线射击游戏之一”。《War Inc. Battle Zone》又是一款以团队为基础的PvP游戏,但这次游戏未能保持它的平衡性。

该工作室的创始人Sergey Titov曾在一次采访中清楚表示,他理解平衡性是游戏的一大优势,免费游戏中较低的价格点也是一大优势。

同时他也指出,“所有游戏从定义上看都是社交游戏”,这可能有些夸张,但显然他的意思强调了在线游戏中社交互动性的重要性。他也表明曾在游戏beta测试中对玩家收取费用。在这种情况下,由于他的游戏收取费用,所以我认为目前这款游戏是零售产品。

War Inc.battle zones(from photo.mmosite.com)

War Inc.battle zones(from photo.mmosite.com)

Mr. Titov主动透露,目前有100多万位玩家在试玩《War Inc. Battle Zone》,每个月有20万用户在体验游戏,这样,他们每天可以从每位玩家那获取0.40美元。类似的零售游戏包括《使命召唤:现代战争3》,它一次性收取60美元左右的费用。那么拥有多种价格点的微交易系统在这方面表现应该更胜一筹。现在如果玩家在《War Inc.》中消磨一个月,游戏就可以从每个用户那获取大约12美元收益。这时收益非但没有增加,同比60美元的收费,反而降低了80%。如果微交易模式真的支持订阅的零售付费方式管用,那就不会发生这种情况了。

也许仔细观察这款产品的销售方式会对我们有所启发。游戏会在潜在用户首次登录前,至少向他们提供一个价值40美元的武器包。这样是向潜在用户传递什么信息呢?

显然,预先购买这些武器必然存在一定优势,即使游戏并未详细描述武器的性质。用户过后会认识到,如果她预先购买这些武器,那她能在游戏中占据一定的优势。因此,她本能地将这款游戏归为“花钱取胜”的模式,并认为这款游戏承载着许多霸权商品。如果她不购买这些商品,那么其他购买者日后就会威胁到她。

新手(比如第一波Facebook玩家)不会立刻建立这种联系,但过后他们也进入这种模式,玩家就会对这种关系形成一种共同敏感性。

进入游戏后,玩家会点击道具商店,查看需要购买哪些物品。用户就马上遇到道具更新的625个选项。有些道具花费超过30美元,但是大多数道具的价格在5-10美元之间。

除非它对游戏有用,不然为何有人会高价购买道具?有经验的在线游戏玩家会迅速排斥并及时拒绝这种盈利模式。

记住,虽然我是个骨灰级玩家,但是我也无法从商店中找出需要购买的物品,即使我必须在一个小时内花掉200美元(否则这笔钱会消失)。有些道具需较高级别的用户才可购买,比如30级用户,这样付费者才可以使用。道具要么永久出售,要么用于出租。在《英雄联盟》中,用户如果再次购买道具,就会降低道具的实用性。

你会发现,《War Inc. Battle Zone》打破了我提出的关于减缓盈利模式中霸权商品负面效果的规则。这款游戏的设计师是行业中的老将,并且拥有大量预算。他们可以制作任何一款他们想要的游戏。然而他们误解了微交易的本质,在作者看来,如果游戏品质真如他们所言的一样优秀,他们至少需在游戏上投入1000万美元。

结果分析

本文最主要的理念不是关于如何销售产品,而是兜售产品的哪个部分。相对于现实世界,虚拟世界最大的吸引力在于参加者可以将自己看作精英,这似乎很抽象,而且不公平。如同Jane

McGonigal所指出的,在虚拟空间内不存在失业现象。人人都有机会。你绝对要谨慎设计自己的虚拟世界以维持这种观念——至于你认为这个世界是真实还是虚拟的这并不重要。

在游戏世界中兜售游戏目标会让你的游戏显得不公平性,这只会提醒用户这个世界充满不公平,他们会试图逃跑。他们不会购买这些东西。如果以内容形式贩卖机会,你会震惊于他们的消费热情。

如果你的另一款出色游戏无法盈利,这可能是因为你的盈利模式让用户反感,所以他们拒绝继续玩游戏。不足10%的玩家转变为付费者这一现象就足以说明情况。记住,目前Facebook平台上的产品付费转化率仅为2%-5%左右。

为不同动机和意图的用户提供各种零售价也是一个最大化盈利性的重要手段。这也是单一的订阅模式获利极少的原因之一。如果一位开心的用户持有100美元,并乐意全部用来购买你的商品,你应该满足他们的需求。如果一个有点开心的用户乐意支付10美元,你也要满足他们。不要惩罚支付10美元的用户;只是要为支付100美元的用户提供更多机会。如果你允许付费100美元的用户惩处支付10美元的用户,这与你直接惩罚后者没有区别。

上段内容表明,合作类游戏应允许玩家购买任何有利的道具,但是竞技类游戏不行。这同游戏行业的传统观念背道而驰。同时,这也意味着大型多人合作游戏还有许多未开发的市场。从某种程度上看,我们可以认为《FarmVile》是首款大型合作游戏吗?如果是,那就可以解释它空前胜利的原因。如果可以加速合作,那么就可以减少反社会内容(比如垃圾邮件)的存在,我预计这种结果会永久地改变游戏行业。

大量研究表明,将过多的用户置于过小的空间只会增加他们的侵略性。也就是说,多人游戏奖励投入更多时间的玩家,这会消极影响大量参与者的乐趣。同时,我们知道人们喜欢社交互动性,如果这是积极的互动,那这就是多人游戏的一大吸引力。这表明在一个玩家和“太多”玩家之间存在一个“最有效点”,这是所有游戏应努力获取的因素。而最有效点主要取决于参与者对社交互动善意程度的看法。

消极的社交互动包括聊天中产生的垃圾邮件、“刷币农民”的出现、无交感PvP战斗(我将此称为“玩家vs受害者”,或简称为PvV),以及任何干扰你钟爱活动的行为。积极的社交互动包括

交易、交谈、合作体验以及合作构建活动。许多情况下,我们认为交感PvP也具有高度的社交性,就如现实世界中的体育运动一样。

有极少数玩家对社交性的认知是相反的。通常,我们称这些参加者为“游戏的破坏者”,因为他们喜欢采取反社交互动。这些人的行为会对其他用户的体验产生不同程度的负面影响,所以你需谨慎设计自己的游戏,减轻他们的影响。你处理是否得当将会影响游戏破坏者的规模大小,如果破坏者的这一主要娱乐模式无法得到满足,他们就会对你的产品丧失兴趣。反之亦是如此——如果你不予以制止,他们将会驱散你的其他用户。

越多用户认为你游戏中的社交互动是善意的,你就越能吸引更多用户,那你就能从每款游戏获取更多收益。社交网络游戏中的社交互动性仍然有限。如果这种限制可以得到改善,社交网络游戏将比目前形式获得更多收益。

最后我认为,无限使用订阅盈利模式的拥挤效应可以缓解强大霸权商品的负面影响,也吸引玩家投入更多的体验时间。如果玩家可以通过在游戏中投入16小时来提高战斗力,而且游戏允许此

玩家惩罚只玩2个小时的用户,那么这等于是游戏设计师在惩罚后者。这并无多大好处,而且如果这两位玩家在游戏中投入了同样多的费用,那么这真是弄巧成拙的设计。

总之,解决方法就是让所有游戏呈现合作模式,或者平衡玩家在游戏世界中投入的时间。也就是说,时间的度量标准是所有多人游戏盈利模式中的关键部分。虽然在此我不会透露详细的解决方案,但相信富有创意的设计师应该能够及时地解决这里提出的潜在问题。(本文为游戏邦/gamerboom.com编译,拒绝任何不保留版权的转载,如需转载请联系:游戏邦

Next Generation Monetization: Supremacy Goods

by Ramin Shokrizade

Is your microtransaction-based game set up for failure or success? Consultant and writer Ramin Shokrizade discusses a new class of goods that is likely to damage the health of your user base — and in this article, posits rules for goods as well as taking a hard look at how some games function.

Modern microeconomic theory classifies various goods and services as “inferior,” “normal,” or “luxury,” based on their behaviors in markets and how they are selected by consumers. Interesting discussions also arise regarding goods that defy the intuitive ways they are expected to behave in markets, like “Giffen goods” and “Veblen goods.”

The purpose of this article is to introduce a new model for one of these (at least initially) unintuitive goods that are exceedingly rare in the “real” world, but that are the most common type of good used in the sale of online games: supremacy goods.

My study of microtransaction monetization models since 2001 was the inspiration for this new goods model. Microtransactions are currently the preferred method of charging for online games, and the sole method of direct content sale (not counting indirect revenue streams, such as advertising) for many large companies such as Zynga and Nexon.

Microtransactions involve the sale of specific virtual goods or services, as opposed to a flat one-time fee or subscription. Typically hundreds of microtransactions are available to gamers in each title, and in most cases they can be used to increase the success of players in reaching game objectives relative to those that do not make these microtransaction purchases.

This gives rise to the term “pay to win.” For those that do not pay, these games are described as “free to play”.

The “Golden Ticket” Scenario

Imagine that I have a ski resort that operates 18 ski lifts with associated runs, and that I charge $50 for a daily use general lift ticket that allows unlimited use of any run (with one catch). I sell 2000 of these tickets every day. My new marketing consultant comes up with a great idea to boost revenues: the “Golden Ticket.” The Golden Ticket allows the holder to have exclusive use of any run they desire. Any general use ticket holders on the run will be escorted off and directed to another run. By selling these at $10,000 each, I am told that we can boost revenues from $100,000 per day to perhaps $180,000 or more per day.

On the first day, it works like a charm. We sell five Golden Tickets and our usual 2,000 general lift tickets and make $150,000, for a 50 percent increase in revenue!

On the second day a strange thing happens: We only sell four Golden Tickets, and 1600 general tickets. We take in $120,000, which is not as good as the previous day, but still an improvement over the old monetization model.

By the end of the first week we are bottoming out at three Golden Ticket sales and only 200 general ticket sales — we only made $40,000!? How did this happen? This seemed like a sure winner.

For the general ticket holders, being bumped was very inconvenient, and reduced the value of the lift ticket purchase in their eyes. What was even worse was the anxiety created over not knowing when they would get bumped.

For those purchasers that valued their time more highly, this inconvenience was enough such that they would not have come to our ski resort even if the general tickets were given away free of charge. For some of our wealthiest skiers, they could have paid the $10,000, but for them skiing with others and meeting new people was part of the fun so they had no desire to take advantage of our Golden Tickets.

For those that did buy the Golden Tickets, the novelty soon faded, such that repeat buyers were rare. Some of these big spenders actually enjoyed watching the looks on people’s faces when they got ejected, and as the number and enthusiasm of remaining general ticket holders decreased, this thrill also waned. While this situation might offer them the chance to meet others just like themselves (fellow Golden Ticket holders), these people had a propensity to want to ski by themselves (that’s what they paid for, after all), so their social interaction with their limited number of peers was close to nil.

The Golden Ticket is an example of a supremacy good. A supremacy good is a good or service that reduces the value of all other linked goods and services in its space, including itself. Supremacy goods can initially appear to monetize very high, but over time consumers become adept at identifying any monetization model that contains them. This causes the advantages of the introduction of supremacy goods to self-extinguish. There are two exceptions:

1.An environment where every product contains supremacy goods,

2. A product that consumers perceive as a mandatory purchase.

Good examples of the first case would be online games in China, or games on Facebook. In both cases, there are essentially no alternatives. The sale of SUVs (sport utility vehicles) in the United States is an example of the second condition. In this case, the purchaser is buying a perceived unfair (independent of skill) survivability advantage over those that do not have SUVs in the event of a crash.

While the proliferation of SUVs makes driving more dangerous for everyone, most consumers in the USA perceive automobile purchases as non-optional. Thus to compete (survive), there is strong pressure to also purchase an SUV. As SUVs fill the roads, the initial safety advantage that was purchased decreases in value, because two SUVs colliding are less safe than two small cars colliding. Thus SUVs are a rare example of a non-virtual supremacy good that does not auto-extinguish (at least not for safety-related reasons).

Microtransaction-Monetized Games

These products are almost always sold as online “free-to-play” games. In multiplayer games, where inter-player competition is strongly encouraged (to drive sales via the “SUV” exception) there is no charge whatsoever to log in and be defeated by a payer. This is an undesirable outcome for a number of reasons, so people not wishing to buy victory will tend to leave these products for alternative offerings. In China, or perhaps on Facebook (more on this later), this option may not immediately present itself.

Multiplayer games are generally played on servers, where each server is a distinct play environment that is separate from other servers. For payers on these servers, a game of “virtual chicken” arises where the committed spenders will attempt to outspend each other.

Once the “winner” has been determined by spending the most, monetization activity rapidly approaches zero and servers become similar to ghost towns. The typical Asian microtransaction model-based product adapts to this by starting new servers every few weeks to allow players on dead servers to start the process over again on a new server. Unless you plan to “spend the most” on this next server, at some point the whole process becomes apparently futile, and the consumer will adapt by realizing the only way to win is to not play.

Multiplayer games on Facebook currently exactly follow the trend described in the last paragraph. While no company was willing to give internal numbers, I was able to confirm informally that this scenario is occurring in both Asian and Western mid-core social network games by discussing the subject with developers at GDC 2012.

Single player games, like the now-famous FarmVille (a Zynga product based on a number of other products), are generally referred to as “social games” on Facebook because they are run on that social network. They have a number of anti-social elements, like spam, so I refer to these products as “social network games” to be clear.

Since inter-player interaction is limited in these games, purchases cannot be used to directly harm the play experience of others not spending as much, as in multiplayer microtransaction games. Nonetheless, social network games are designed to foster a certain amount of “hey, look what I did”, to create peer competition.

Thus the sale of game objectives will act as a more mild supremacy good unless peer pressure is intense inside a friend network, in which case you get the “SUV effect” boosting sales.

The History of Supremacy Goods in Games

The first example of a supremacy good that I can recall seeing in the industry was introduced to a product I was helping Nexon develop in 2001 called Shattered Galaxy (the first MMORTS, massively multiplayer real time strategy game). This was possibly the most extensively beta tested MMO of all time (a good thing, considering its complexity). Apparently Nexon at some point decided to abandon its first USA-based game to focus again on Asian development, so it went out with a bang by dropping an overpowered unit into the game for an additional fee. This provided a quick short-term injection of funds before Nexon transferred the game to a third party.

Declaring success, and claiming to be the first to use microtransactions, Nexon went on to develop the popular MMO MapleStory. By now the emphasis was totally on microtransactions and supremacy goods. At the time, gamer budgets in Asia were not as large as they are today, so microtransactions were seen as a way to provide lower initial price points (a good thing) and discriminatory pricing (also a good thing). These two characteristics made the microtransaction monetization model more effective in Asia than the unlimited (flat) subscription monetization system (a set price per month of service).

Without the same cultural emphasis on sportsmanship and fairness, Eastern players were less adversely affected by the presence of supremacy goods, and these became ubiquitous in all products produced in Asia (outside of Japan) from 2005 on.

Meanwhile, MMO projects in the West were having significant difficulties managing real money transfer attacks on their virtual worlds. These attacks, while not solely originating in China, mostly were directed from there.

These quickly undermined the virtual economies of those worlds, making them less enjoyable over time. The lack of discriminatory pricing and flexible price points in Western subscription based games further challenged Western MMO profits.

The result was that English-first subscription-based MMO games released from 2003 to 2011 had extremely high, and costly, failure rates. Only the most exceptional products (such as World of Warcraft, EVE Online, and City of Heroes) managed to really perform well during this period. Others (too many to mention) either were shut down quickly or were converted to microtransaction-based monetization models in order to try to salvage some additional revenue.

It must be noted that even EVE Online and City of Heroes, both profitable with subscriptions, have added microtransactions to their monetization models in recent years. World of Warcraft boosts its revenues by charging for regular content expansions.

Supremacy Goods Dynamics

If everyone buys the same supremacy good, it is no longer a supremacy good, as no one gains an advantage from it. In such a situation, it is more appropriate to describe such a transaction as a “content purchase”. Greater advantage comes when one can stack multiple supremacy good purchases in a short time frame.

Some game developers, such as IGG in its Galaxy Online series, actually broadcast supremacy goods purchases in world chat in their games.

While this has been extremely useful to me in my research as I attempt to understand supremacy goods dynamics, I have always found it odd that some companies think this will improve monetization.

If you look at their whole monetization scheme, it seems apparent that they are trying to copy the methods that major casinos like those in Las Vegas are using.

Winning in Las Vegas does not generally prevent anyone else from winning — at least on slot machines — so Las Vegas does not use supremacy goods to drive revenues.

From my experience, when one player spends $5,000 in the period of a few weeks on a game server, it does not motivate others to do the same thing. Rather, the tendency is for groups of players to join essentially a “death watch”, which involves them waiting for the next new server to be opened so that they can escape sure and unfair destruction on their present server.

Similarly, if an amusement park wants to sell “front of the line” passes, it should be very careful to make sure others (that have been in line for an hour or two) do not have to suffer watching VIPs stroll right to the front of the line. If you charge enough for this service, it will yield short-term gains, but long term, this is a disastrous strategy. Disney’s Fastpass system is an example of this sort of system — and it’s very carefully designed to be both free and fair.

I have developed a number of advanced and intuitive monetization models that completely avoid the problems with microtransactions and “pay to win”, but for those limited to using microtransactions for lack of an alternative, I have a number of rules to optimize that model:

Don’t allow microtransactions to be stacked an unlimited number of times. If you let someone buy a 50 percent boost an unlimited number of times, and they buy 40 of them, it will be like Godzilla stomping on Tokyo…

Make your price menu so simple that a novice will understand it the first time they read it. If reading the Encyclopedia Britannica is fun for you, you are so self-entertained that there is no game we can provide you that will make your life even better.

Allow multiple price points, but keep the number of choices a single digit at all times. If my eyes start bleeding and it takes me two days to read all the items in your premium store, I’m gonna make Santa put coal in your stockings. Remember, it’s a game, not a Sears catalog.

Make them earn it (I also call this “play to pay”). No one wants to see a new player walking around with something it took you six months to earn. By the same token, a person will feel more prestige having something earned and paid for, rather than just paid for. Make them earn the item before you let them buy it.

Most virtual goods change in value over time. Most goods drop in value over time; some don’t. How this works is a bit complex, and analytics apps don’t know how this works any better than you do. I will give an example in the next section.

Experts only – Gamify your microtransaction model. Make a microtransaction purchase a strategic decision. You can do this by limiting how often or when players can purchase one, or better yet give every boost some disadvantage along with it. This is more difficult. Make sure you are comfortable with the first five rules before trying this one.

Examples

Since I can only find two recent (I believe my Shattered Galaxy game design from 2001 had similar elements) examples of monetization/game designs that largely follow my suggested rules to limit supremacy goods, I am going to discuss both of them. I will follow by using a counter example that breaks almost every rule I propose, while appearing to be certain to succeed due to its quality and genre popularity.

The first example is World of Tanks by Wargaming.net. The game allows the purchase of a subscription to boost experience point and coin gain from every battle. Since everyone can purchase this, and only purchase this once (no stacking), the subscription is perceived as “fair”. There are some cash-only tanks that can be bought for use, but all of these have both advantages and disadvantages so they are also perceived as “fair”.

Special ammo can be purchased with cash, but the effects on play are not enough to be considered “unfair” by all players I have interviewed. The highest tier tanks tend to cost more to repair than is earned from battle, so over time players must buy additional currency to keep playing.

This would be perceived as unfair if all tiers of tanks were present in all battles (because the payers would have bigger tanks), but because World of Tanks is designed to match players in battles with other tanks of similar tier, fairness is maintained in each battle. Thus payers get bigger tanks, but only play against other payers with big tanks, so there is no abuse of the pay advantage.

World of Tanks never confronts the customer with more than a few price decisions at a time, the most complex choice typically being which of six upgrades to their current tank to purchase next.

All of these choices are clearly explained. No one is allowed to just step into the biggest tanks without earning them first, no matter how much money they are willing to spend. Thus it meets my definition of “play to pay”. The value of goods in this game is stable, so there is no need for “sales”, and those that pay one price won’t be upset later when that price gets discounted. Equity is conserved.

Play in World of Tanks involves team co-op (you must coordinate with your team members to win), which is a strong social reinforcement. World of Tanks also has consensual “fair” PvP, which is also a strong reinforcement. This is a very potent combination. If the co-op play was considered “unfair” (one guy hogging all the kills/points), or if the PvP was considered “unfair” (one or more opponents is undefeatable for reasons other than skill), then these would be potent turn-offs for participating consumers. This means that if you try to copy this design type without being conscious of the effects of supremacy goods, what looks like a winning design will turn out to be the opposite.

World of Tanks gets it all right, and apparently the game is hugely successful. So successful, in fact, that Wargaming.net is now developing two additional games, World of Warplanes and World of Warships, both presumably using exactly the same combination of game design and monetization elements.

My next example is League of Legends by Riot Games. League of Legends has gameplay that involves team-based balanced consensual PvP, just as World of Tanks does. The scale is smaller, with each team having three or five members depending on the map, as opposed to 15 vs. 15 in most World of Tanks battles. The graphics are not as photorealistic, but gameplay is intense, and there is less downtime after defeat than there is in World of Tanks because you respawn again after a short time.

Purchases are primarily in the form of Champion unlocks. There are over 100 champions available for play in the game. Every day, a few of these are made available for anyone to use for free, but the “free” Champions rotate, so that if you want to use your favorite Champion on a regular basis, you must pay to unlock it. The price is about $8, with some bundles available allowing you to buy 20 or so Champions at once at a steep discount. Some of the less-desired Champions are also discounted to boost sales.

This is essentially a “pay for content” purchase, and as long as all the Champions are balanced, this does not create supremacy goods. To drive sales, new Champions are introduced on a regular basis, and these tend to be slightly better than older Champions.

To be competitive, players are generally encouraged to use the new champions, which act as mild supremacy goods. Riot maintains careful balance, so the community does not perceive the situation as overly unfair. If the new Champions were much stronger, then all equity invested in previous Champions would be erased, and existing players would begin to reject the product.

Champions level in each bout from level 1 to up to 18. These levels are not persistent between bouts. The primary account does level from 1 to 30, but the benefits of this are relatively modest. Riot sells experience boosts to allow faster leveling, but since the benefits of this are so modest, this is not perceived as unfair — so these are not treated by consumers as supremacy goods. Runes can also be purchased, but again these are of limited benefit, so they are perceived as mild and tolerable supremacy goods.

Success in matches is largely determined by a player understanding the strengths and weaknesses of his Champion vs. the strengths and weaknesses of opposing champions.

Given that there are now over 100 Champions, this presents a fairly steep learning curve for new players, but the game is fairly easy to understand overall, so the model is well received. As players will presumably purchase their most desired Champion first, the utility of each additional purchase will go down. This is not accommodated in the model, and is a missed opportunity to maximize monetization.

With a Metacritic rating of 78, and fairly simplistic gameplay, the game still manages to have over 32 million registered users and is rapidly expanding to allow play in more parts of the world. As the game is doing better than the Metacritic rating would suggest, I propose that this is due to the careful attention to mitigate the presence of supremacy goods in its model. This may be because there are so many hardcore gamers on the development team, and this is a primary concern during the hiring process. They understand supremacy goods on at least an intuitive level.

My last example is War Inc. Battle Zone by Online Warmongers Group, a game that is being distributed aggressively via Steam and which looks very high budget. The developer describes it as “The most realistic, tactical, clan-based combat experience coupled with one of the deepest customization systems ever developed for an online shooter.” Again, this is a team-based PvP game, but this time there is no attempt to maintain balance.

What made this product stand out for analysis was this interview. Here, the founder of the company, Sergey Titov, clearly states that he understands that there is an advantage to games that are perceived as balanced, and that having the lower price points available in free-to-play games can also be a boon.

He also says “all games are social by definition”, which might be an exaggeration, but clearly he means to communicate the importance of social interaction in online games. He also states that he is charging during the beta test of his product (which was ongoing when this article was written.) In this case, I treat his game in its current condition as a retail product since it is being charged for.

Mr. Titov volunteers that over 1 million players have tried the game, 200,000 play it every month, and that they monetize at the rate of about $0.40 per player per day. Similar retail games, such as Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3, sell at a price point of around a $60 one-time charge. A microtransaction system should perform better, due to its multiple price points. Right now War Inc., if played for a full month, is bringing in about $12 per user. That’s not an increase; it’s a decrease of 80 percent vs. a flat $60 fee. If microtransactions perform better than retail purchases with subscriptions (the popular consensus), then this should not be happening.

Perhaps a closer look at how this product is selling what might be helpful. Before the potential consumer can even log in fully for the first time, they will be offered at least one weapons package for around $40. What is the message that is communicated to the potential customer here?

Clearly, there must be some advantage to buying these weapons up front, even if there is no description of what that is. The consumer is left to conclude that these weapons will give her an advantage in the game if she purchases them. She can tell instinctively that this game is “pay to win” and is loaded with supremacy goods. If she does not buy these goods, someone else will, and they will be used on her.

New gamers (like the first wave of Facebook gamers) don’t immediately make this connection, but over time they do, and this has created a communal gamer sensitivity to this relationship.

Once in the game, the starting player can click on the item store to see what things are available for purchase. The consumer is immediately confronted with 625 (!) options to spend on item upgrades. Some of these cost in excess of $30, but most are in the $5 to $10 range.

Why would someone spend that much for gear unless it was needed to play? Experienced online game players will tend to be repelled immediately and will in time (if not immediately) reject the monetization model.

Note that even though I am an expert gamer, I could not figure out what to buy in the store even if I had to spend $200 in one hour or lose the money. Some of the items were marked as requiring higher levels, as high as level 30, before they could be used by non-paying members. Items are sold either permanently or for rent. As in League of Legends, each item purchase after the first will have reduced utility to the buyer, but this is not accounted for in this game’s model.

You can see that this title breaks every rule I propose for mitigating the negative effects of supremacy goods in your monetization model. The designers involved in the product are industry veterans with a large budget. They could have made any game they wanted to. Here, their misunderstanding of the nature of microtransactions (more is better) is, in the author’s opinion, going to cost them at least 10 million dollars if the product is of the quality they claim.

Analysis

The most important concept in this paper is that it’s not just how you sell your product, but what part of your product you sell. A great part of the attraction of virtual worlds is that participants see them as a Grand Meritocracy, as opposed to the real world, which can often seem arbitrary and unfair. As Jane McGonigal points out, there is no unemployment in virtual space. Everyone has opportunities. Absolute care must be taken in the design of your virtual world to maintain this perception — whether you consider it real or illusion is irrelevant.

Selling the game objectives in your world makes your game unfair and just reminds your customers of the inequities of the world they are trying to escape from. They literally won’t buy this. Sell them opportunity, in the form of content, and they will buy up that opportunity with an enthusiasm that will shock you.

If your otherwise very awesome game is failing to monetize, chances are good that something in your monetization design has turned your customers off to your product and they are rejecting it. Player to payer conversion rates of under 10 percent are an almost certain sign that this is occurring. Note that conversion rates on Facebook are currently around 2 percent to 5 percent, depending on the product.

Setting multiple price points for customers of varying motivations and means is also extremely important for maximizing monetization. This is one reason why flat subscriptions do poorly. If a happy customer has $100 and wants to give it to you, you should let them. If a somewhat happy customer is struggling in real life and would like to give you $10, you should let them. Don’t punish the $10 customer; just give the $100 customer more opportunities. If you give the $100 customer the opportunity to punish the $10 customer, this is the same as if you had punished the customer yourself.

The contents of the previous paragraph imply that any advantage that can be bought should be allowed in cooperative play, but not in competitive play. This is the opposite of conventional wisdom in our industry. This also implies that there is a vast untapped market for massively multiplayer cooperative games that, to my knowledge, do not exist yet. Was FarmVille, on some level, perceived by the community as the first massively cooperative game? If so, this might explain its unprecedented success. If cooperation could be boosted, and anti-social content (like spam) mitigated, I predict the results would change the game industry forever.

Various studies have shown that putting too many people in too small a space makes them more aggressive. This means that multiplayer games that reward you for spending more time in them could create a negative effect on participant enjoyment from crowding. We also know that people enjoy social interaction, if it is perceived as positive, and this is a big draw in multiplayer games. This implies that somewhere between one player and “too many” players, there is a “sweet spot” that all games should strive to achieve. Where that sweet spot is is largely determined by participant perception of how benevolent that social interaction is.

Examples of negative social interaction include world chat spam, the presence of gold farmers, non-consensual player vs. player combat (I call this “player vs. victim”, or PvV), and any activity that interferes with your preferred activity. Positive social interaction includes trade, talking, cooperative play, and cooperative construction activities. In many cases, consensual PvP is also considered highly social, as it is in sports in the real world.

For an extremely small minority of players (on the order of 1 percent), these perceptions are reversed. These participants are often called “griefers” because they enjoy initiating anti-social interactions. These individuals can have a disproportionately negative effect on the experience of other customers, so care must be taken in your design to mitigate their influence. How well you do this will actually effect the concentration of griefers in your product, since griefers will lose interest in your product if their primary mode of entertainment is not satisfied. The converse is also true — so unchecked, they will route your other customers.

The more your customers perceive the social interaction in your world to be benevolent, the more you can crowd into that world, and the more you can charge per world.

Social interaction in social network games is still very limited. If this can be improved, social network games will monetize much higher than they do currently.

As my final point, I would suggest that the crowding effect of unlimited use subscription monetization models makes these monetization methods a moderate to strong supremacy good, favoring those that spend more time in them. If you allow a player to get powerful by spending 16 hours a day in your world, and then allow that player to punish your customer that only plays two hours a day, then you as the game designer have punished the two hour player. There is no upside to this, and if they are both paying you the same amount, this is just self-defeating design on multiple levels.

The solution is, again, to make all play cooperative, or balance the amount of time players are allowed to spend in each world. This means the time metric itself becomes a critical component of all multiplayer monetization models. While I will not present specific solutions here, the creative designer should be able to, in time, solve all of the possible confounds presented here.

[Ed. note: The author wishes to include a note that the majority of this piece was originally penned in February, and while he believes that there have not been significant changes to the information contained within since, nor have his predictions proven false, it's written from the perspective of that time.](source:gamasutra)


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